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ABSTRACT 
How has China used economic policy to create leverage in its relationships with 
its Asian neighbors? Through comparative case studies of China’s political and economic 
relationship with the Philippines and its political and economic relationship with 
Cambodia, this thesis supports the notion that China uses cooperative economic policy to 
entice political support from its poorer, lesser developed neighbors while using coercive 
economic policy to extract political concessions from its more advanced, emerging 
neighbors. In short, China uses coercive economic policy to extract concessions from 
Manila while it uses cooperative economic policy to woo Cambodian support in the same 
disputes. 
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How has China used economic policy to create leverage in its relationships with 
its Asian neighbors? China’s rise and its global ambitions make up a popular narrative 
among policymakers and scholars.1 The argument goes that China’s global ambitions are 
inextricably linked to its economic policy in the South China Sea. In short, China’s global 
ambitions rely on regional peace and prosperity as dictated by Beijing; such regional 
peace facilitates a stable environment for the exchange of resources that China depends 
on for further growth. To reach this aim, China uses different political levers to 
encourage policy concessions from its neighbors. One of the levers it routinely uses is 
economic policy.2 Yet, when viewed with more nuance, China seems to use categorically 
different economic policies with its different neighbors, using coercive policy with its 
more developed neighbors and cooperative policy with its less developed neighbors. By 
studying the economic policy that China employs with its Asian neighbors, I hope to 
better understand the tactics it employs globally to advance its global ambitions. This 
thesis presents comparative case studies of China’s economic relationship with the 
Philippines and Cambodia, concluding with a chapter on the global implications of my 
findings. This introductory chapter reviews the literature on China’s economic policies, 
details my research question, explains my hypothesis and research design, and introduces 
the economic background of the Philippines and Cambodia cases that serve as the 
empirical material upon which this thesis is based. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW: GLOBAL AMBITIONS 
The topic of China’s global ambitions is popular in both academic and public 
spheres, with significant literature in both. If China is to continue its remarkable economic 
success, built on eight percent annual GDP growth on average since the early 1980s, it 
                                                 
1 Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, Red Star Over the Pacific: China’s Rise and the Challenge 
to U.S. Maritime Strategy (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2010), 11.  
2 Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power Is Transforming the World (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007), 84. 
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must secure a steady, uninterrupted source of natural resources.3 China depends on the 
import of a large portion of the resources used to fuel its economy: it imports a majority of 
its timber, platinum, aluminum, iron ore, and copper. Perhaps though, most critical to 
China’s continued growth is its import of oil.4 China is already the world’s largest buyer of 
oil, and the country’s continued growth will exacerbate the demand moving forward.5 
From 1995–2005, Chinese consumption of oil doubled to 6.8 million barrels per day.6 
Chinese recognize the importance of the commodity to China’s continued success. While 
serving as Premier of the People’s Republic, Wen Jiabao acknowledged that his country 
faced a “growing dependence on imports of some important minerals from foreign 
countries.”7 In 2003 in fact, China surpassed Japan as the world’s second-largest consumer 
of oil.8 In 2004, China’s oil consumption increased by 16 percent year over year while 
Chinese output only increased by 2 percent over that same period, highlighting China’s 
inability to find a domestic solution to its growing oil demand.9  
China’s efforts at securing these valuable resources have taken them to the corners 
of the earth, making it a country with global ambitions.10 China has focused much of its 
efforts in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East.11 From 2008–2011, the Export-
Import Bank of China announced that it spent $20 billion in investment in Africa.12 In 
Latin America, China has emerged as a major source of Foreign Direct Investment.13 This 
                                                 
3 Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive, 86. 
4 Ibid., 40–1. 
5 Clifford Krauss and Keith Bradsher, “China’s Global Ambitions, With Loans and Strings Attached,” 
New York Times, July 24, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com. 
6 Ian Taylor, “China’s Oil Diplomacy in Africa,” International Affairs 82, no. 5 (2006): 942, doi: 
10.1111. 
7 Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive, 41. 
8 Taylor, “China’s Oil Diplomacy in Africa.” 
9 Ibid. 
10 Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive, 5. 
11 Ibid., 11. 
12 Serge Michel, “When China Met Africa,” Foreign Policy 166 (2008): 41, http://www.jstor.org/
stable/25462292. 
13 Kevin P. Gallagher and Roberto Porzecanski, “China Matters: China’s Economic Impact in Latin 
America,” Latin American Research Review 43, no. 1 (2008): 188, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20488114. 
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increase has been a positive one from an economic standpoint in Latin American countries 
that are strapped for cash as China’s efforts in the region have “contributed to lowering the 
cost of capital for Latin American and the Caribbean net debtors.”14 In the Middle East, 
China focuses on purchasing equity stakes, pumping cash into the region.15 In Iran in 2004, 
China signed a memorandum of understanding with the Islamic Republic that would allow 
a Chinese state owned enterprise to develop Iran’s largest undeveloped oil field “in 
exchange for agreeing to buy 10 million tons of Iranian liquefied natural gas annually for 
25 years.”16 In these regions, China has promised aid and investment to countries that are 
desperate for it. In exchange, China secures long-term deals that put a lock on those 
countries’ resources for Chinese use.17 In Africa, China gains access to resources such as 
oil, copper, uranium, cobalt, and timber.18 In Latin America, China receives iron ore, 
copper, oil and leather.19 In the Middle East, China has built a trade network that will 
provide it with a supply of oil for the foreseeable future.20 
1. Economic Interdependence 
Regarding China’s global ambitions, policymakers and academics rely on two 
dominant schools of thought in an attempt to explain Chinese policy: economic 
interdependence and realism. Some economic interdependency theorists argue that 
China’s focus is actually on impacting regional affairs in the South and East China Seas, 
using its global reach to secure resources toward that aim.21 These scholars argue that the 
Chinese threat to American global hegemony is overinflated, citing the challenges that 
the Chinese economy will face in the coming decades, claiming that they will pose 
serious obstacles to China moving forward. Joseph Nye argues that China is faced with 
                                                 
14 Gallagher and Porzecanski, “China Matters,” 189. 
15 Steve A. Yetiv and Chunlong Lu, “China, Global Energy, and the Middle East,” Middle East 
Journal 61, no. 2 (2007): 205, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4330385. 
16 Yetiv and Chunlong Lu, “China, Global Energy, and the Middle East,” 205. 
17 Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive, 11; and Krauss and Bradsher, “China’s Global Ambitions.” 
18 Serge Michel, “When China Met Africa,” 41. 
19 Gallagher and Porzecanski, “China Matters,” 190. 
20 Yetiv and Chunlong Lu, “China, Global Energy, and the Middle East,” 205. 
21 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “China’s Rise Doesn’t Mean War,” Foreign Policy 184 (2011): 66. 
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headwinds of poverty, inequality, and demographic issues.22 Coupled with a slowing 
growth rate, he writes that China’s rise is much more benign. After all, he claims, “Not 
every power’s rise leads to war.”23  
Other scholars who subscribe to economic interdependency theory attest that 
deeply integrated economic interconnectedness in the region has created a stable regional 
system where Asian countries look to China as the leader.24 These scholars argue that in 
this context, China’s rise is aimed at securing its role as the regional hegemon. In the East 
China Sea for example, an area considered “a powder keg of nationalism and shifting 
geopolitics,” many argue that major players in the region have avoided armed conflict 
due to the devastating economic implications that such conflict would have on each.25  
Some subscribers to economic interdependency theory take a different stance, 
arguing that the effects of economic interdependency are limited. Benjamin Goldsmith, 
for example, cautions that such ties are only responsible for regional peace and are not 
applicable to non-Asian dyads.26 Despite this split, economic interdependency theorists 
subscribe to the same general argument: that high levels of economic interconnectedness 
will reduce the potential of armed conflict due to the devastating economic implications 
for all parties. 
2. Realism 
Proponents of realism subscribe to a different view of international relations and 
therefore different thoughts regarding China’s actions in the global arena. Realists argue 
that the international system, anarchic in nature, is in a constant security struggle where 
each state attempts to take advantage of other states and where war is always a 
                                                 
22 Nye, “China’s Rise Doesn’t Mean War,” 66. 
23 Ibid., 66. 
24 Benjamin B. E. Goldsmith, “A Liberal Peace in Asia?,” Journal of Peace Research 44, no. 1 
(2007): 19, doi: 10.1177/0022343307072427.  
25 Paul O’Shea, “How Economic, Strategic, and Domestic Factors Shape Patterns of Conflict and 
Cooperation in the East China Sea Dispute,” Asian Survey 55, no. 3 (2015): 570, http://www.jstor.org/
stable/10.1525/as.2015.55.3.548. 
26 Goldsmith, “A Liberal Peace in Asia?,” 19. 
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possibility.27 This view provides an alternative narrative in explaining China’s global 
ambitions and actions on the international stage compared to that provided by economic 
interdependency theorists. Many realists argue that in an anarchic international system, 
China is incentivized to maximize its strength. As a counter, the United States and other 
powers will balance against China, resulting in a standoff a la the Cold War with the 
potential to escalate into a hegemonic war.28  
As with economic interdependency theorists, there exists a split in scholarship in 
the realist school. Other realists take a subtler stance on the implications of China’s rise. 
Charles Glaser, for example, argues that “conflict is not predetermined” between the 
United States and China. He suggests that the potential sources of conflict are not 
provided by the international system, which he claims are relatively weak and ineffectual, 
but on secondary regional disputes that are unique to East Asia. This view means that the 
navigation of these complex regional issues is more critical in preventing a war than is 
the traditional realist view of power accumulation and subsequent balancing.29 
3. Regional Ambitions 
Returning to China’s requirement for resources to fuel its economy, some scholars 
argue that the country must establish a regional peace to facilitate the maritime exchange 
of those resources that China has accumulated in the global market. The argument is that 
such a regional peace creates a structure that facilitates the transfer of the resources that 
China needs to continue to fuel its economy.30 As such transfer is accomplished 
predominantly via maritime trade, the importance of a regional peace is highlighted in 
this argument as regional conflicts and border disputes are destabilizing affairs that make 
maritime trade difficult while also carrying the potential for a downward spiral into a 
                                                 
27 John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security 19, 
no. 3 (1995): 9, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539078. 
28 Charles Glaser, “Will China’s Rise Lead to War? Why Realism Does Not Mean Pessimism,” 81. 
29 Glaser, “Will China’s Rise Lead to War?,” 81 
30 M. Taylor Fravel, “Growing Competition in the South China Sea,” in The Long Littoral Project: 
South China Sea, 42-60, CNA Analysis and Solutions, March 2013.  
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broader war.31 Such instability would be economically devastating to the Asian continent 
and the world at large as more than $5 trillion of maritime trade passes through the region 
each year via container ship.32 
Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote that the “starting point and foundation” of sea 
power is “the necessity to secure commerce, by political measures conducive to military, or 
naval strength.”33 In their 2010 book, Red Star Over the Pacific: China’s Rise and 
Challenge to U.S., Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes wrote, “Ensuring the physical 
freedom of movement across the maritime commons is central to economic and military 
endeavors that the Chinese regime considers crucial to the nation’s economic vitality and 
prestige.”34 In Yves-Heng Lim’s 2014 book, China’s Naval Power: An Offensive Realist 
Approach, Lim argues that “the primary objective of a regional hegemony will be to 
prevent the formation of an adverse coalition between distant great powers and local 
opponents. This could be achieved by fielding a naval force devoted to sea denial 
missions.”35 
Recent evidence supports these claims regarding China’s regional aims and 
maritime strategy. Recognizing the importance of dictating a peace with its neighbors in 
the South China Sea (SCS) region as the regional hegemon, China set out on a mission to 
dictate a peace on China’s terms with its neighbors in the 1990s through the use of hard 
power, particularly through the use of the People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLA-N). 
China took hardline approaches with its SCS neighbors during this period, sending 
destroyers to disputed territories in the Spratly Islands while fiercely arguing for its 
neighbors to abandon their alliances with the United States.36 
                                                 
31 Fravel, “Growing Competition,” 37. 
32 Ibid., 41. 
33 Yoshihara and Holmes, Red Star over the Pacific, 11. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Eric Grove, Book Review, “China’s Naval Power: An Offensive Realist Approach,” 84. 
36 Eric Hyer, “The South China Sea Disputes: Implications of China’s Earlier Territorial Settlements,” 
Pacific Affairs 68, no. 1 (1995): 34–54. 
 7
4. Failures of Hard Power and the Turn to Soft Power 
These hard power tactics failed, and China’s neighbors bristled at Beijing’s 
stance. This failure drove a wedge between China and its neighbors in the region, driving 
some of those neighbors into a more integrated alliance with the United States while also 
creating a narrative that warned of China’s aggressive international behavior.37 Chinese 
leaders recognized the failure of this policy and attempted to change the narrative, 
coining the phrase “Peaceful Rise.”38 In a 2004 speech outlining the country’s new 
strategy, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao said that China’s rise “will not come at the 
cost of any other country, will not stand in the way of any other country, nor pose a threat 
to any other country.”39 Since China lacked the hard power necessary to dictate a 
regional peace, Chinese leadership had to find an alternative to enact its will. 
As China’s foray into the use of hard power in the 1990s demonstrated, it did not 
possess the requisite tools to alter other states’ actions. When hard power is inadequate, 
soft power becomes appropriate. Nye defines soft power as “getting others to want the 
outcomes that you want,” and he explains that it “co-opts people rather than coerces 
them.”40 The distinction then between hard power and soft power is that hard power uses 
what Nye calls command power, which is a state’s ability to change the actions of other 
states, while soft power uses co-optive power, which is a state’s ability to change the 
desires of other states.41 States have many tools at their disposal in how they will wield 
soft power. Gregory Holyk writes, “The sources of this attraction are culture, political 
values, and foreign policies.”42 Holyk continues in his article to quantify Chinese soft 
power, concluding that its soft power is best demonstrated in five areas: economic 
                                                 
37 Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive, 38. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Joseph S. Nye Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Perseus Books, 
2004), 5.  
41  Ibid., 7. 
42 Gregory G. Holyk, “Paper Tigers? Chinese Soft Power in East Asia,” Political Science Quarterly 
126, no. 2 (2011): 223. 
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factors, human capital, shared cultural norms, foreign policy, and diplomacy.43 Yiwei 
Wang wrote that diplomacy is the main tool by which China exerts its soft power, citing a 
2007 piece written by Joshua Cooper Ramo in which he declared, “China’s greatest 
strategic threat today is its national image.”44  
Scholars debate the tools by which China exerts its soft power. One of the more 
prominent theories in literature today is China’s use of economic soft power. The 
aforementioned Chinese investment in Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East that 
are aimed at securing global resources fit into this model. In his book Charm Offensive, 
Joshua Kurlantzick wrote, “over the past decade, Beijing has begun to use aid, trade, 
investment, and the allure of China’s economic model, which combines growth with state 
control, to charm other nations.”45 China’s economic power is such that it has the clout to 
force other nation’s hand of action through coercion, and many states now fear Chinese 
economic power more than its military might.46 China maintains record trade surpluses 
with nearly each of its trading partners, boasts a savings rate of more than 40 percent, and 
its manufacturing might is well documented.47 Smaller countries in the global economy 
fear the possibility of their “markets being swamped by cheap Chinese goods, companies 
ruined by China absorbing investment that would have gone elsewhere, workers laid off 
by competition from China’s massive labor force.”48 If China were to tap into this fear 
though, it would not be utilizing soft power. The softness of China’s economic power 
comes from the allure of the Chinese economic model to other states’ leaders who hope 
to realize similar growth in their own countries by implementing similar aspects of the 
Chinese model without surrendering control. As China seeks to realize this goal, it 
creates a set of “win-win economics” by which other countries will benefit by China’s 
continued rise through the creation of a larger Chinese consumer market for other 
                                                 
43 Holyk, “Paper Tigers?,” 224. 
44 Yiwei Wang, “Public Diplomacy and the Rise of Chinese Soft Power,” Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science 616 (2008): 257, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25098003. 
45 Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive, 84. 




countries’ manufactured goods.49 Kurlantzick argues that an example of this strategy is 
Beijing’s creation of a 2004 conference on “Economic Diplomacy Toward Developing 
Countries.”50 
What have been the effects of this strategy? Shaun Breslin wrote in his 2005 piece 
on “Rethinking China’s Global Economic Role,” “Increasing the attraction of China as a 
low-cost production platform to produce exports to external markets has resulted in job 
losses elsewhere, distorted and perhaps even undermined the developmental strategies of 
other states, and led to a reconfiguration of the East Asian political economy.”51 As the 
Chinese economy has grown by leaps and bounds over the past several decades it has 
commanded an ever-increasing share of global FDI, “leaving its once-glittering 
neighbors—Thailand, South Korea, Singapore—with crumbs.”52 An overtly coercive 
foreign policy that took advantage of this information would run counter to the publicized 
Chinese intentions concerning their peaceful rise. As Jiang Zemin said, “We 
should…establish a publicity capacity to exert an influence on world opinion that is as 
strong as China’s international standing.”53 With this in mind, China focused its efforts 
on enticing its regional neighbors; the past decade witnessed high levels of investment 
from Chinese state-owned companies into Cambodia, Burma, Laos, Thailand, and 
Vietnam at the bequest of Beijing.54 China has also used free trade deals and trade 
concessions to entice other states, and its efforts have been particularly aggressive in 
Southeast Asia. In 2001, China proposed a free trade zone with ten Southeast Asian 
countries while offering an “Early Harvest Package” which would reduce duties on 
Southeast Asian agricultural products.55 Beyond these bilateral and multilateral economic 
deals, China has become more involved in the regional economic institutions and 
                                                 
49 Ibid., 87. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Shaun Breslin, “Power and Production: Rethinking China’s Global Economic Role,” Review of 
International Studies 31, no. 4 (2005): 736, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40072118. 
52 Breslin, “Power and Production,” 750. 
53 Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive, 39. 
54 Ibid., 91. 
55 Ibid., 95. 
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initiatives since the 1990s as witnessed with the ASEAN-China Free Trade Act and the 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia.56 Scholars who argue China’s 
utilization of soft power suggest that these arrangements exemplify China’s strategy of 
creating win-win economics in the region. The argument is that instead of leaving its 
poorer neighbors to slip into financial ruin through China’s continued dominance of 
shares of extra-regional FDI, it has attempted to create some semblance of shared wealth 
and prosperity in the region to advance its goals of regional hegemony while convincing 
its neighbors and the world of the benefits to its peaceful rise. These efforts have had 
quantifiable impacts. In 1991, trade between China and Southeast Asia totaled $7.9 
billion; by 2002 the trade between the two totaled $39.5 billion—an average annual 
increase of 20 percent.57 Additionally, China has offered “mutual benefit loans” to select 
countries in the region. These loans are large lines of credit at below-market rates over 
long periods of time to fund public works projects in the targeted countries.58 
5. Coercion or Cooperation? 
Despite the existing literature that highlights the use of Chinese economic soft 
power, the question remains: is China creating a system of shared economic success, a 
zero-sum economic system, or is it using both systems in different bilateral relationships? 
The implications of the answer to this question would explain whether China’s economic 
policies are cooperative or coercive and when it employs those different strategies. While 
leaders in Beijing use language to assert that China’s rise is peaceful and that it is indeed 
trying to create a win-win economic system with the countries that it woos with its charm 
offensive, is that really its economic goal? The answer is complicated as language used 
by leaders and economic data alone cannot answer the question. In his 2012 article, 
“China’s Potential for Economic Coercion in the South China Sea Disputes,” Madhu 
                                                 
56 Zhang Yunling and Tang Shiping, “China’s Regional Strategy,” in Power Shift, edited by David 
Shambaugh (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005), 52. 
57 Ramkishen Rajan, “Emergence of China as an Economic Soft Power: What Does It Imply for 
South-East Asia?,” Economic and Political Weekly 38, no. 26 (2003): 2639 http://www.jstor.org/stable/
4413726. 
58 Deborah Brautigam and Tang Xiaoyang, “Economic Statecraft in China’s New Overseas Special 
Economic Zones: Soft Power, Business or Resource Security,” International Affairs 88, no. 4 (2012): 799. 
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Sudan Ravindran attests to the difficulty of determining Beijing’s true intent. He explains 
that China’s “intention to impose sanctions was never officially acknowledged, and 
sometimes even explicitly denied.”59 In this environment, the targets of what is 
potentially coercive Chinese economic policy are left to deduce whether or not China is 
using coercive economic policy after sudden economic or trade policy changes. In these 
cases, what really matters is not Chinese signaling or intentions, but the perceptions of 
those affected by such changes.60 Similarly, in his 2013 article on Chinese Economic 
Statecraft, James Reilly explained that China opaquely clouds the instances of its use of 
coercive policy. By clouding these instances, Beijing minimizes the damage to its 
peaceful rise narrative, maintains political flexibility, and limits political backlash.61 In 
this environment, it becomes more obvious that China uses different instances of 
economic policy to achieve its objectives. Reilly writes that we do not witness a grand 
Chinese economic strategy, but rather a “selective application of economic incentives and 
punishments designed to augment Beijing’s diplomacy” in a case by case basis.62 The 
question then, is when does China use coercive vice cooperative economic policy and 
how can we identify each? 
a. Cooperative Economic Policy 
Reilly continues, “Given China’s economic heft, a minor shift in China’s trade, 
aid, or investment can have a massive effect on a smaller economy.”63 This statement 
epitomizes China’s use of cooperative economic policy. An important part of China’s 
mission to prop up its image as a benevolent power is its distribution of preferential trade 
agreements and foreign aid.64 It is relatively easy to discern when China elects to use this 
                                                 
59 Madhu Sudan Ravindran, “China’s Potential for Economic Coercion in the South China Sea 
Disputes: A Comparative Study of the Philippines and Vietnam,” Journal of Current Southeast Asian 
Affairs 3 (2012): 108. 
60 Ravindran, “China’s Potential for Economic Coercion,” 108. 
61 James Reilly, “China’s Economic Statecraft: Turning Wealth into Power,” Lowy Institute for 
International Policy (November 2013): 8. 




policy. In an effort to make the developing world aware of its benevolence, these 
instances will be afforded much publicity. In these cases, China will extend unconditional 
benefits toward its target with hopes that “sustained economic engagement will 
eventually produce a political transformation and desirable changes in target behavior.”65 
Reilly reminds us that toward these goals, we should expect to see China extend carrots 
such as infrastructure projects and other grandiose construction projects as such projects 
satisfy domestic demands of the target while also easing challenges associated with 
resource extraction.66 
This leads to a discussion of when we should expect to see China’s use of 
cooperative economic policy. Reilly explains that we will see these instances when China 
is dealing with smaller, lesser developed countries. In these cases, China can get the 
largest return on its investment as small extensions of concessionary economic policy 
have a huge impact on smaller, lesser developed nations.67 
b. Coercive Economic Policy 
In his article, “The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion,” Daniel Drezner defines 
economic coercion as “the threat or act by a sender government or governments to disrupt 
economic exchange with the target state, unless the target acquiesces to an articulated 
demand.”68 Meanwhile, in his article, “China’s Potential for Economic Coercion in the 
SCS Disputes,” Madhu Sudan Ravindran defines economic coercion as “the deliberate, 
government-inspired withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of customary trade or financial 
relations.” T. Clifton Morgan writes that sanctions are governmental interactions where 
the sender uses its domestic actors to increase barriers to economic exchange via its 
                                                 
65 Michael Mastanduno, “Economic Statecraft, Interdependence, and National Security: Agendas for 
Research,” Security Studies 9, no. 1–2 (1999): 288–316. 
66 Reilly, “China’s Economic Statecraft,” 5. 
67 Reilly, “China’s Economic Statecraft,” 9. 
68 Daniel W. Drezner, “The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion,” International Organization 57, no. 
3 (2003): 643. 
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domestic corporations.69 These complimentary definitions neatly frame what we will 
look for as evidence of instances of coercive Chinese economic policy. 
In China’s case specifically, Reilly clearly defines what Chinese coercive policy 
will look like and how we can discern when Beijing wields it. First, Reilly explains that 
economic coercion has a fundamental place in the history of the People’s Republic. He 
writes that since its inception in 1949, PRC “leaders have provided aid or refused trade in 
support of broader strategic and ideological objectives.”70 Despite China’s aims in 
support of a strategic objective, Zhao Kejin of Tsinghua University opines that “China’s 
economic advantage has not yet been translated into strategic advantage.”71 If China is to 
use its economic clout coercively toward a strategic advantage, Reilly writes that we 
should expect to see a specific set of tools: “limiting investments, imposing trade 
restrictions, freezing financial assets, punishing or rewarding foreign corporation, and 
shifting foreign currency holdings.”72 
Reilly provides several specific examples of coercive economic tools that China 
has used in the past. In the 2012 clash with Japan over the Senkaku Islands, China 
tightened inspections of Japanese imports while discouraging Chinese tourists from 
visiting Japan.73 Such actions were never explicitly identified by China as responses to 
Japanese policy, but the veiled nature of the actions combined with their timing suggests 
that this episode was an example where China employed coercive policy. 
The 2012 conflict with Japan leads into a discussion of when we should expect to 
see Beijing’s use of coercive economic policy. Remembering that we expect to see the 
use of benevolent, cooperative policy with smaller, less developed countries, Reilly 
reminds us that the inverse is also true; we should expect to see coercive economic policy 
used when Beijing clashes with more developed nations—as it did with Japan in 2012. 
                                                 
69 T. Clifton Morgan and Navin A. Bapat, “Imposing Sanctions: States, Firms, and Economic 
Coercion,” International Studies Review 5, no. 4 (December 2003): 65–6. 
70 Reilly, “China’s Economic Statecraft,” 3. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid., 9. 
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The existing literature has provided a clear view of how and when China wields 
both coercive and cooperative economic policy. When dealing with poorer and lesser 
developed countries, we should expect Beijing to employ a cooperative economic policy 
marked by the unconditional extension of aid packages. Conversely, when embroiled in a 
political debate with more developed states that are economically emerging, we should 
expect to see China use coercive economic policy. Instances of the use of this policy will 
be concealed by Beijing, but we should expect to see vague and veiled threats, increased 
barriers to economic exchange, and threats or actual withdrawal of trade. I turn now to 
describing the research design for this project, focusing on case selection and a 
description of the Philippines and Cambodia cases, which serve as the empirical basis for 
examining how China exerts economic leverage in Southeast Asia.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How has China used economic policy to create leverage in its relationships with 
its Asian neighbors? In order to answer this question, this thesis examines the degree to 
which China uses coercive or cooperative economic policies in the region by placing its 
individual policies on a spectrum of coercion. Specifically, I use comparative case studies 
of China’s economic strategies with the Philippines and Cambodia to identify patterns in 
how China uses economic leverage to achieve its goals. 
D. HYPOTHESIS 
As the largest regional economy, China possesses a strong ability to influence its 
regional neighbors’ policy decisions. This influence is a very real source of power. China 
uses this power in different ways with different countries, at times using coercive 
economic policy and using cooperative, win-win economics in other instances. The fact is 
that when it comes to regional politics, China usually achieves its objectives. This thesis 
demonstrates how Beijing uses economic tools to achieve those objectives. I hypothesize 
that when China is dealing with poorer, underdeveloped countries—like Cambodia—it 
seeks to prop up its image as a benevolent power through the use of a win-win economic 
system. Meanwhile, when dealing with more economically advanced emerging countries 
that have an ongoing dispute with China—such as the Philippines—it uses coercive 
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economic policy. China uses these different strategies to either achieve specific 
concessions in a conflict—such as is the case with the Philippines—or to gain broader 
regional support—as it does in its relationship with Cambodia. A comparative study of 
China’s bilateral relations with each country serves as an avenue through which we can 
better understand Chinese economic policy and strategy. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
My research incorporates a broad swath of economic data to identify Chinese 
economic policy, demonstrating instances when China created a system of economic 
incentive through a win-win system and when China created a zero-sum system. These 
economic data sources are integrated into case studies that deliver recent historical 
narratives of China’s bilateral political relationship with the two countries. Assuming that 
China usually achieves its regional goals and focusing on the method by which it 
achieves them, I argue that such victories are either at the expense of another country or 
operate through a set of mutually beneficial interests. In this way, as the two case studies 
illustrate, Chinese economic policy and strategy can be identified as either coercive or 
cooperative. 
This thesis presents two comparative case studies of China’s economic relations 
and policy with both the Philippines and Cambodia. These two countries are in different 
economic strata—the Philippines ranked 40th in global 2014 gross domestic product 
(GDP) data while Cambodia came in at 115th—and are at different stages 
developmentally.74 Additionally, Chinese relations with Cambodia and the Philippines 
are markedly different. The Philippines is involved in a very public territorial dispute 
with China while Cambodia has regularly been a supporter of Beijing’s interests in this 
and similar disputes.75 
                                                 
74 “Gross Domestic Product 2014,” The World Bank, April 11, 2016, http://databank.worldbank.org/
data/download/GDP.pdf. 
75 Prashanth Parameswaran, “Cambodia: A New South China Sea Mediator Between China and 
Asean?,” The Diplomat, July 28, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/07/cambodia-a-new-south-china-sea-
mediator-between-china-and-asean.  
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Before developing timelines for my two case studies, I must explain why the 
selection of the Philippines and Cambodia is appropriate. Table 1 displays three major 
economic and development indicators for the 10 members of the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN), ranked from richest to poorest. Those indices include gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita, gross national income (GNI) per capita, and the 
United Nations’ human development index (HDI). GDP is an appropriate benchmark of 
economic development; it is the measure of a country’s total economic output within its 
borders and is widely accepted as a measure of a country’s wealth and buying power. 
GNI is another widely-used metric of economic development. GNI is the sum of GDP 
plus the value of goods and services generated overseas by that nation’s citizens. GNI is 
another widely-accepted benchmark of economic development since it includes both the 
value of goods and services produced within a country’s borders and the wealth 
generated by its citizens abroad. Finally, HDI is defined as “a summary measure of 
average achievement in key dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, 
being knowledgeable and have a decent standard of living.”76 The U.N. explains that it 
created the index to stress that “people and their capabilities” should be considered in 




                                                 
76 “Human Development Index (HDI),” United Nations Development Programme, Accessed May 7, 
2016, http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi 
77 “Human Development Index (HDI), “United Nations Development Programme.” 
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Table 1.   2014 ASEAN Data 
State GDP (per capita), USD78 GNI (per capita), PPP79 HDI80 
Singapore $56,284.60 80,270 0.912 
Brunei $40,979.60 72,190 0.856 
Malaysia $11,307.10 24,770 0.779 
Thailand $5,977.40 14,870 0.726 
Indonesia $3,491.90 10,190 0.684 
Philippines $2,872.50 8,450 0.668 
Vietnam $2,052.30 5,350 0.666 
Laos $1,793.50 5,060 0.575 
Myanmar $1,203.80 See note a 0.536 
Cambodia $1,094.60 3,080 0.555 
a Data was not available at time of publication 
 
I endeavored to select two countries to contrast China’s employed economic 
policy—one further along the economic and development spectrum and one further 
behind. I compiled economic and development data for all 10 ASEAN members, 
planning to pick one that was further developed and one that was lesser developed. 
Cambodia serves as an excellent subject for the cooperative case study due to its lagging 
economic statistics and its publicly positive relationship with China. By contrast, the 
Philippines has had very public, ongoing territorial disputes with China in the South 
China Sea. While it is in the lower half of the ASEAN members on an economic and 
development scale, a closer examination of the data revealed that the Philippines is 
sufficiently further along the spectrum of development and separated far enough from 
Cambodia to serve as a contrast. The following passages offer a more detailed contrast of 
the economic picture in the two countries.  
 
                                                 
78 “GDP Per Capita (Current US$),” The World Bank, accessed March 28, 2016, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD. 
79 “GDP Per Capita (Current US$),” The World Bank, accessed March 28, 2016, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD. 
80 Human Development Report 2015: Work for Human Development, United Nations Development 
Programme  (New York: United Nations Development Programme, 2015), 208–211.  
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F. ECONOMIC PROFILE: THE PHILIPPINES 
Empirical economic data paints a fairly consistent picture: while still considered 
an emerging economy, the Philippines is sufficiently further along the spectrum of 
development when compared to Cambodia and is therefore a worthy subject of a study 
that considers China’s use of coercive economic policy. In conducting this brief analysis, 
I recognize the benefits and drawbacks of a bevy of economic indicators. While GDP is a 
popular benchmark of economic development, it fails to take into account human 
development. Meanwhile, more development-focused indices such as the Human 
Development Index fall under criticism as they seek to compress a complex analysis into 
an output represented by a simple number that arbitrarily assigns weights to different 
developmental factors.81 Recognizing these limitations, I sought to incorporate as wide a 
range of economic indices as practical. In this analysis, I will incorporate data from the 
following indices: GDP purchasing power parity (PPP), GDP PPP per capita, gross 
national income (GNI), and human development index (HDI). In each of these indices, 
the Philippines is portrayed as further developed than Cambodia, serving as a useful 
analytical comparison. 
1. Economic Data 
GDP data demonstrates the Philippines’ status as an advanced emerging 
economy. According to the World Bank’s GDP Atlas method data, the Philippines ranks 
in the top fifth of all global economies at $284.7 billion.82 If adjusting for PPP, the 
Philippines ranks 28th internationally at 690.9 billion international dollars.83 Due to the 
country’s burgeoning population, adjusting GDP PPP per capita lowers the Philippines 
international ranking to 152nd at 7,500 international dollars per person.84 The World 
                                                 
81 International Human Dimensions Programme on Global Environmental Change, “Why Do We 
Need Inclusive Wealth,” accessed March 12, 2016, http://inclusivewealthindex.org/inclusive-wealth#the-
better-indicator. 
82 “Gross Domestic Product 2014,” The World Bank, April 11, 2016, http://databank.worldbank.org/
data/download/GDP.pdf. 
83 “Gross Domestic Product 2014, PPP,” The World Bank, April 11, 2016, 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP_PPP.pdf. 
84 “The World Factbook,” Central Intelligence Agency, Accessed March 20, 2016, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html. 
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Bank’s 2014 Gross National Income Atlas method data ranks the Philippines 34th 
internationally at $347.5 billion.85 The economic data since 1989 paints a fairly 
consistent picture: the Philippines is drastically further along the economic development 
spectrum than Cambodia. According to World Bank data since 1989, Philippine GDP 
was never ranked lower than 34th and since 2004 has never been ranked below 30th.86  
2. Developmental Data 
The United Nations Human Development Index (HDI) offers a different picture 
of Philippine development, ranking the country115th internationally.87 When considering 
the Philippines’ HDI data though, it becomes apparent that the country is on a steady 
upward trajectory of development. While the most recent 2014 data ranks the Philippines 
115th in HDI, the United Nations classifies it as a Medium Development country.88 From 
1980 to 2012, the Philippines’ HDI composite index increased from .561 to .654, an 
increase of 17 percent with an annual average increase of 0.5 percent. The available data 
is clear: from an economic perspective and from a human development perspective, the 
Philippines is further developed than Cambodia and therefore serves as an appropriate 
subject for my study on coercive Chinese economic policy. To demonstrate the contrast, I 
offer a similar analysis of Cambodia’s economic and development data. 
G. ECONOMIC PROFILE: CAMBODIA 
In its summary of the Cambodian economy, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) wrote in the World Fact Book, “Cambodia remains one of the poorest countries in 
Asia and long-term economic development remains a daunting challenge, inhibited by 
endemic corruption, limited human resources, high income inequality, and poor job 
prospects.”89 A snapshot of Cambodia’s current development status is similarly 
                                                 
85 “Gross National Income per Capita 2014, Atlas Method and PPP,” The World Bank, April 11, 
2016, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GNIPC.pdf. 
86 “Gross Domestic Product 2014.” 
87 “Philippines,” United Nations Development Programme, Accessed March 10, 2016, 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/PHL. 
88 “Philippines.” 
89 “The World Factbook.” 
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revealing. The CIA continued in its analysis, “As of 2012, approximately 2.66 million 
people live on less than $1.20 per day, and 37 percent of Cambodian children under the 
age of 5 suffer from chronic malnutrition…. The population lacks education and 
productive skills, particularly in the impoverished countryside, which also lacks basic 
infrastructure.”90 A brief overview of economic and development data makes it clearly 
obvious that Cambodia is a laggard in development and economic factors and therefore 
serves as a good subject for my second case study on China’s use of cooperative 
economic systems to woo policy concessions from lesser developed countries. 
Similar to my economic analysis of the Philippines, I sought to increase the 
accuracy of my analysis by including a wide-range of economic indicators. In this 
analysis, I incorporate data from the same indices: GDP, GDP PPP, GDP PPP per capita, 
GNI, and HDI. In each of these indices, Cambodia is portrayed as a lesser developed 
nation compared to the Philippines, making the country a good subject for my case study 
on cooperative Chinese economic policy. 
1. Economic Data 
In Cambodia’s case, GDP data demonstrates Cambodia’s trailing status in the 
global economy. According to the World Bank’s 2014 GDP Atlas method data, 
Cambodia ranks 116th of 194 national economies with a GDP of USD $16.78 billion.91 
When adjusting for PPP, Cambodia ranks 103rd of 187 national economies at 50.01 
billion international dollars according to the World Bank’s 2014 statistics.92 When 
considering GDP PPP per capita data, Cambodia ranks 144th of 185 countries at 3,263 
international dollars.93 Additionally, the World Bank’s 2014 GNI Atlas method data 
ranks Cambodia 184th in its index at USD $1,020, and if adjusting for PPP, Cambodia 
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ranks 177th at 3,130 international dollars.94 The economic data is fairly clear: Cambodia 
is in the lower tier of national economies.  
2. Developmental Data 
Since a significant portion of my research is dependent on the developmental 
status of the countries that China interacts with, I again refer to the United Nations 
Human Development Project data regarding the developmental status of Cambodia. 
While Cambodia is portrayed as making developmental progress in this data, its overall 
HDI in 2014 is only 0.555, ranking it 143rd of 188 countries and territories.95 While 
classified as a medium development country, Cambodia’s average HDI of 0.555 is well 
below the average data of 0.630 for other medium development countries.96 More 
importantly, Cambodia’s HDI data considerably lags behind the 0.710 average HDI of 
other Pacific Asian countries and the 0.696 average of the other ten ASEAN states.97 In 
summation, even though Cambodia is classified as a medium developed country, it 
significantly lags behind other medium developed nations, its East Asian neighbors, and 
its ASEAN partners. This data coupled with the various economic indices paints clear 
picture regarding Cambodian development: Cambodia is a lesser developed country and 
will therefore serve as an appropriate example in my case study on cooperative Chinese 
economic policy. 
In the following chapters, I examine the validity of my hypothesis concerning the 
ways in which China exerts economic leverage by examining China’s relationship with 
the Philippines and Cambodia. 
                                                 
94 “Gross National Income per Capita 2014, Atlas Method and PPP.” 
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II. THE PHILIPPINES: A PICTURE OF COERCION 
A. FRAMING 
In order to understand how China uses economic policy to create political 
leverage with its more developed neighbors, we need to examine how aggressive or 
cooperative its economic policies are when dealing with these more developed nations. In 
this case study, I will seek to establish a pattern of changes in China’s economic policy 
when responding to actions by the Philippines that could be perceived as provocative, 
arguing that such is indicative of China’s broader economic policy when dealing with 
emerging countries. I propose that when China is dealing with more economically 
advanced developing countries—such as the Philippines—it uses coercive economic 
policy to create leverage in international disputes. In my characterization of the Chinese 
economic relationship with the Philippines, I will focus on three specific levers that 
China relies on in its extortion of the Philippines: bilateral trade, overt governmental 
economic sanctions, and Chinese aid flows to the Philippines. 
1. Bilateral Trade: Framing the Argument 
The Philippines maintains a substantial trading relationship with China. As of 
January 2016, China was the largest source of Philippine imports. In January, the total 
value of Philippine payments to the People’s Republic totaled $1.22 billion.98 This 
represented an increase of 38.1 percent from the $866.27 million total value of imports 
recorded in January 2015.99 The total value of Philippine exports is not as tilted toward 
China, though. In January 2016, Philippine exports to China only totaled $405.65 million, 
ranking it as the fourth largest importer of Philippine exports. In this regard, China only 
accounts for 9.1 percent of total Philippine exports, ranking it behind Japan (20.2 percent 
at $939.17 million), the United States (15 percent at $697.33 million), and Hong Kong 
                                                 
98 Lisa Grace S. Bersales, “External Trade Performance: January 2016,” Philippine Statistics 
Authority, March 23, 2016, http://www.census.gov.ph/content/external-trade-performance-january-2016. 
99 Bersales, “External Trade.”  
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(12.3 percent at $574.85 million).100 Since the Philippines has other more important trade 
partners, it may be somewhat insulated from any Chinese coercive pressure through 
trade. As a result, China is forced to use more heavy-handed coercive methods when 
Beijing seeks policy concessions from Manila. Nevertheless, there do appear suspicious 
instances during periods of Sino-Philippine conflict when Chinese import of Philippine 
products fell off dramatically. In this next passage, I will review some of those instances. 
In order to demonstrate that China uses economic coercion to enact political 
concessions when dealing with more developed countries, I used the World Bank’s 
World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) to calculate the annual trade deficit between the 
Philippines and China from 1998 onward. I chose 1998 as the first year of my study so as 
to avoid any irregular patterns in the data caused by the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. 
China veils its economic policy, very rarely publicly acknowledging economic 
sanctions and the targets of such action. In his 2012 article, “China’s Potential for 
Economic Coercion in the South China Sea Disputes,” Madhu Sudan Ravindran attests to 
the difficulty of determining Beijing’s true intent. He explains that China’s “intention to 
impose sanctions was never officially acknowledged, and sometimes even explicitly 
denied.”101 In this environment, the targets of what is potentially coercive Chinese 
economic policy are left to deduce whether or not China is using coercive economic 
policy after sudden economic or trade policy changes. This is exactly what I set out to 
determine by examining anomalies in the year-to-year trade balance between the 
Philippines and China. I sought to gather economic data and compare it to a bilateral 
geopolitical timeline, looking for cues that China is using economic coercion in its 
bilateral trade relationship with the Philippines. 
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2. Import Restrictions
Using the World Bank’s WITS databank, I calculated Philippine exports to China 
and imports from China. From this data, I derived the trade imbalance and the annual 
delta for each category. That data is compiled in Table 2. 
Table 2.   Chinese-Philippine Bilateral Trade 
Year 
GDP 
Growth PHL Imports From CHN PHL Exports to CHN 
Exports 
Delta (%) Imbalance 
Delta 
(%) 
1998 -0.60% $1,326,307,710.00 $343,660,450.00 -$982,647,260.00 
1999 3.10% $1,112,008,830.00 $574,791,680.00 0.67 -$537,217,150.00 -0.45 
2000 4.40% $875,458,600.00 $663,290,260.00 0.15 -$212,168,340.00 -0.61 
2001 2.90% $1,074,344,630.00 $792,756,340.00 0.20 -$281,588,290.00 0.33 
2002 3.60% $1,351,978,920.00 $1,355,825,250.00 0.71 $3,846,330.00 -1.01 
2003 5% $1,950,662,870.00 $2,144,647,040.00 0.58 $193,984,170.00 49.43 
2004 6.70% $2,816,821,590.00 $2,653,036,300.00 0.24 -$163,785,290.00 -1.84 
2005 4.80% $3,134,145,290.00 $4,076,995,780.00 0.54 $942,850,490.00 -6.76 
2006 5.20% $3,869,393,240.00 $4,627,660,380.00 0.14 $758,267,140.00 -0.20 
2007 6.60% $4,232,894,630.00 $5,749,864,120.00 0.24 $1,516,969,490.00 1.00 
2008 4.20% $4,561,087,160.00 $5,469,185,930.00 -0.05 $908,098,770.00 -0.40 
2009 1.10% $4,060,394,090.00 $2,933,923,480.00 -0.46 -$1,126,470,610.00 -2.24 
2010 7.60% $4,954,295,250.00 $5,724,466,520.00 0.95 $770,171,270.00 -1.68 
2011 3.70% $6,504,582,500.00 $6,102,252,270.00 0.07 -$402,330,230.00 -1.52 
2012 6.70% $7,136,409,950.00 $6,159,105,790.00 0.01 -$977,304,160.00 1.43 
2013 7.10% $8,554,076,970.00 $6,582,556,740.00 0.07 -$1,971,520,230.00 1.02 
2014 6.10% $10,283,720,910.00 $8,033,653,090.00 0.22 -$2,250,067,820.00 0.14 
In this data, three years stood out as anomalies. In 2008, Philippine exports to 
China declined for the first time over the period of my study. In 2009, Philippine exports 
to China fell even further, representing the largest decrease over the period of my study (-
46 percent). This year represents the third largest trade imbalance the Philippines had 
with China over my study. Finally, 2012 stands out as a year of flat export growth to 
China. While Philippine exports to China grew steadily over the course of my study—
except for the years of negative growth mentioned previously—exports in 2012 remained 
stagnant when compared to 2011, growing only 1 percent. With this economic data in 
hand, my goal became to establish a bilateral geopolitical timeline that provides insight to 
the anomalies in the economic data of 2008, 2009, and 2012. Understanding that China 
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veils its coercive economic policy, it is impossible to directly link changes in trade data 
directly with Chinese intervention. As a result, the data and the timeline that follow 
should be considered in the creation of a contextual framework of the Chinese-Philippine 
economic relationship and not as an indictment of coercive Chinese economic policy. 
B. TIMELINE 
In this timeline, I included primary and secondary sources to establish a bilateral, 
geopolitical timeline that would provide potential explanations to the outliers I 
established in my preceding research. The timeline that follows is comprised of seminal 
events in the Chinese-Philippine relationship. 
1. The Years 2008–2009: Conflict in the South China Sea
Recent territorial conflict in the South China Sea between the Philippines and 
China has been well documented, making a detailed summary unnecessary here. David 
Scott provides an excellent history in his 2009 article, “Conflict Irresolution in the South 
China Sea,” and Bill Hayton’s 2014 book The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power 
in Asia is perhaps the most exhaustive history of the subject. Today’s conflict is rooted in 
the Chinese experimentation with hard power in the 1990s. During this period, China set 
out on a mission to dictate a peace predicated on Beijing’s terms through the use of hard 
power, particularly through the use of the People’s Liberation Army-Navy. China took 
hardline approaches with its SCS neighbors during this period, sending destroyers to 
disputed territories in the Spratly Islands in clashes with the Philippines over territorial 
sovereignty.102 During this decade, the PLA took on construction projects of 
observational and logistical structures on contested maritime structures such as Mischief 
Reef. Viewed as an affront to Philippine sovereignty, the Philippines responded 
by arresting Chinese fishermen encroaching on Philippine territorial claims.103 These  
skirmishes continued until 1995 when both countries agreed to a code of conduct to 
102 Eric Hyer, “The South China Sea Disputes: Implications of China’s Earlier Territorial 
Settlements,” Pacific Affairs 68, no. 1 (1995): 34–54. 
103 Ian James Storey, “Creeping Assertiveness: China, the Philippines, and the South China Sea 
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prevent similar future incidents and to increase bilateral cooperation and exploitation in 
and of the region.104  
The code of conduct did little to dispel the bilateral tension in the region; each 
country continued to posture against the other with different levels of assertiveness over 
the next decade. In 2004, ASEAN and China agreed to a Declaration of Conduct of 
Parties in an attempt to decrease tension and increase cooperation in the region.105 
According to the press release, “Under the DOC, cooperation activities may include: 
marine environmental protection, marine scientific research, safety of navigation and 
communication at sea, search and rescue operation, and combating transnational 
crime.”106 Under this framework, Vietnam, the Philippines, and China agreed to a joint 
venture in oil exploration.107 This arrangement precipitated domestic unrest in the 
Philippines as the venture deviated from ASEAN’s stance of negotiating with China over 
SCS issues in a multilateral arena. Additionally, this arrangement made sizeable 
territorial concessions to China as one-sixth of the water to be surveyed was territory 
claimed by the Philippines, outside the Exclusive Economic Zones of both Vietnam and 
China.108  
Political opponents of President Arroyo’s administration quickly advanced a bill 
that would strictly define Philippine territory based on the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) guidelines governing archipelago nations. The bill passed 
and was signed into law in 2009. The Chinese embassy was quick to protest the signing 
of Republic Act 9522, saying “The Chinese embassy hereby expresses strong opposition 
and solemn protest and reiterates that Huangyan Island and Nansha Islands have always 
been part of Chinese territory and that the People’s Republic of China has indisputable 
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sovereignty over these islands and their adjacent waters.”109 This protest kept with the 
status quo of measured Chinese verbal protests in the past. Where this event breaks in 
history though, is the Chinese economic response. For the first time in this study, Chinese 
imports of Philippine goods fell by 5 percent in 2008 before falling off 46 percent in 
2009—the year the bill was signed into law.110 This episode marks a distinct shift in 
Chinese policy. While relying on hard power in the 1990s, China seemed willing to use 
economic coercion in an attempt to force Manila’s hand.  
2. The 2010 Nobel Prize 
While the 2008–2009 incident demonstrates Beijing’s willingness to use 
economic coercion to force policy concessions from Manila, the 2010 Nobel Prize award 
to Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo demonstrates that Beijing complements its coercive 
economic punishment with coercive economic carrots when dealing with more advanced 
emerging nations like the Philippines. 
In December 2008, Liu Xiaobo co-authored a collaborative critique of China’s 
political system known as Charter 08.111 Authored by many Chinese intellectuals and 
dissidents, Charter 08 called for sweeping political reforms in China including legislative 
democracy and a new Chinese constitution.112 The CCP instantly pressured the authors to 
remove their signatures, but Liu faced a tougher fate. Having been involved in human 
rights and political protests since the 1980s, the party decided to make an example of Liu. 
In December 2008, Liu was arrested, charged with subversion, and sentenced to an 11-
year jail sentence in Jinzhou.113 In 2010 the Norwegian Nobel Committee awarded the 
Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo. In an October press release, the committee announced, 
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“Through the severe punishment meted out to him, Liu has become the foremost symbol 
of this wide-ranging struggle for human rights in China.”114 In the release, the committee 
lauded China’s economic advances, but critiqued the regime’s political oppression, 
arguing “China’s new status must entail increased responsibility.”115  
The award and the political critique infuriated Beijing. Before the committee 
publicly announced the award, China privately warned Norway that the award would 
threaten a bilateral trade deal.116 After the award was made public, China attempted to 
prevent individual countries from attending the ceremony. In a memo to every diplomatic 
mission stationed in Oslo, the Chinese diplomatic mission warned each to not “do 
anything against Chinese interests.”117 Likewise, Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Cui 
Tiankai publicly warned that any country in attendance of the Nobel ceremony would 
“have to bear the consequences.”118 China’s coercive strategy was successful; of the 65 
invited countries, only 44 sent delegates compared to the 100 percent attendance rate in 
2009 when American President Barack Obama received the award.119 The Philippines 
was one of those countries that decided against sending representation to the 
ceremony.120 With memories fresh of the Chinese willingness to use exploitative 
economics in 2008 and 2009, the Philippines yielded to Beijing’s pressure. Beijing 
reciprocated with an economic carrot: Philippine exports to China increased from USD 
$2.9 billion in 2009 to USD $5.7 billion in 2010—an increase of 95 percent, the largest 
year-over-year increase of my study. 
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3. The 2012 Scarborough Shoal Incident 
The final example I will use to demonstrate Chinese coercive economic policy 
when dealing with emerging nations is the 2012 Philippine-Chinese conflict over 
Scarborough Shoal. Relations between China and the Philippines remained tense after the 
2009 signing of the Philippine Baseline Act and built from that point. In 2011, the 
Philippines officially recognized the South China Sea as the West Philippine Sea.121 In 
2011 at Reed Bank, China responded by dispatching a Chinese Marine Surveillance craft 
to intercept a Philippine seismic survey vessel in contested waters.122 These back and 
forth challenges continued until events boiled over in the Scarborough Shoal incident, 
providing China another opportunity to use coercive economics. 
In April 2012, a Philippine Navy surveillance aircraft spotted Chinese fishers 
docked at Scarborough Shoal—a maritime feature claimed by the Philippines and 
contested by China and Taiwan—the navy sortied a naval vessel to investigate. A 
standoff ensued when the Philippine naval vessel was intercepted by a Chinese Maritime 
Surveillance Vessel that shielded the fishing vessels.123 After a brief standoff, the 
Philippines withdrew the naval vessel and replaced it with a less-equipped coast guard 
cutter in an attempt to deescalate the situation. China increased the size of its force in the 
standoff by dispatching several Fisheries Law Enforcement vessels. After weeks of 
standoff, China decided to dislodge the standoff through economic policy. In May, a 
banana shipment from the Philippines to China was rejected for failing to meet a new set 
of more stringent phytosanitary requirements. In the same month, Chinese travel agencies 
began suspending all travel arrangements to the Philippines.124 
It appears that the major changes in the trade data from 2008, 2010, and 2012 
neatly coincide with periods when China was responding to major provocations by the 
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Philippines or rewarding it for support. I recognize the risk of overstating the Chinese 
government’s implied impact on trade patterns, since import and export patterns in a 
global economy are subject to a wide range of complicated global and bilateral economic 
factors. There were obviously strong global economic currents at work from 2008–2012 
that wreaked havoc on other nations’ trade trends. Nevertheless, the bilateral trade picture 
is important to consider when exploring China’s economic policy. In his article, “China’s 
Potential for Economic Coercion in the SCS Disputes,” Madhu Sudan Ravindran defines 
economic coercion as “the deliberate, government-inspired withdrawal, or threat of 
withdrawal, of customary trade or financial relations,” making bilateral trade an 
important aspect to consider.125 In that same article, Ravindran asserts that in the wake of 
veiled Chinese economic policy, states are left to wonder if sudden macroeconomic shifts 
are the result of clashes with China. Thus, the Philippines is left to deduce whether or not 
some of these downturns in Chinese import of Philippine products is a result of the 
Philippine’s clashes with China in the early 2000s. Without a clear response from 
Beijing, it remains difficult to credit or disprove the idea that the two are related. One 
thing is certain: in many of these instances, the Philippines responded by making policy 
concessions to China. Ravindran reminds us that the Philippine response to such 
instances—and thereby its implied perception of them—is the most important 
consideration in this discussion. 
Fortunately, we can also tie these specific periods of conflict between the 
Philippines and China to specific, overt government actions on behalf of China against 
the Philippine economy. While it is problematic to generally tie bilateral trade trends to 
overt government actions—especially in China’s case when it so closely guards and veils 
its policy intentions—due to the impact of global economic trends, overt economic 
government actions taken by Beijing against Manila make the coercion argument easier 
to make. 
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C. OVERT GOVERNMENT ACTIONS 
In the following passages, I will examine two other economic levers China uses in 
its coercive economic relationship with the Philippines: overt government sanctions and 
the distribution of economic aid. 
1. Banana Embargo 
Banana is the most important fruit crop for the large Philippine agricultural sector. 
In 2011, the Philippine agricultural sector made up more than one-fifth of the Philippine 
economy, employing approximately one-third of the entire country’s workforce.126 
Specifically, banana is the Philippines second largest agricultural export; in 2012, the 
Philippines produced 9 million metric tons of the crop.127 China is the largest buyer of 
Philippine bananas.128 According to Stephen Antig, president of the Philippine Banana 
Growers and Exporters Association, of the 75 million boxes of bananas that Philippine 
companies export each year, more than half are bought by China.129 China is a critical 
market for Philippine banana. Conversely, Philippine banana shipments are not as critical 
to China. In 2012, Chinese imports of Philippine banana accounted for just 0.02 percent 
of all Chinese imports and 12 percent of all fruit imports, representing low opportunity 
cost for China and high potential for exploitation.130 Banana exporters were shocked over 
the sudden increased inspection requirement imposed by China as the industry has always 
taken careful steps to protect the country’s most important export crop.131 The banana 
embargo is estimated to have cost the Philippine economy USD $23 million.132 In 2011, 
the Philippine government reported proceeds from banana export to be $472.38 
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million.133 The banana fiasco extended to other Philippine fruit shipments bound for 
China. Since China claimed that the rejection was due to phytosanitary concerns and 
violations, it decided to slow inspections of other Philippine fruit exports such as 
papayas, mangoes, coconuts, and pineapples for closer inspection.134 
2. Tourism Restriction 
Similar to Philippine banana exports, Chinese tourism in the Philippines is a large 
industry—Chinese tourists accounted for about 10 percent of all tours in the 
Philippines—that is ripe for exploitation. In May 2012, the BBC reported that the state-
owned China Travel Service admitted to reporters that all trips to the Philippines had 
been suspended from April to May 2012 because of an order from the National Tourism 
Administration citing “strong anti-China sentiment” in the Philippines. Tourism in the 
Philippines was responsible for USD $3.1 billion that year—nearly 2 percent of 2012 
Philippine GDP—and provided 778,000 jobs to Filipinos.135 The cancellation of Chinese 
tours to the Philippines over this short two-month period is estimated to have cost the 
Philippine economy USD $1 million.136 
3. Broader Economic Impact 
Accompanying the tour restrictions and fruit embargo during the standoff over the 
Scarborough Shoal, we also witnessed a specific drawdown in Chinese imports of 
Philippine goods, indicating not only microeconomic sanctions but also broader 
macroeconomic sanctions. In 2012, China imported USD $6.16 billion of Philippine 
goods compared to USD $6.10 billion the year prior—representing growth of only one 
percent year over year, the lowest growth period during my study. 
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D. CHINESE AID TO THE PHILIPPINES 
Tracking Chinese aid extended to the Philippines is an important part of 
understanding China’s coercive economic policy toward the Philippines. Unlike trade 
linkages that are subject to broader global economic currents, aid flows are more overt 
and subject to direct government action. For this characterization, I took a similar 
methodological approach to my characterization of Chinese aid flows to Cambodia. I 
used AidData’s open database for international development to quantify Chinese aid 
flows. I then used the Information Office of the State Council’s 2014 white paper as well 
as Grimm et al’s work to qualify China’s aid flows to the Philippines—complete projects, 
goods and materials, technical cooperation, Chinese medical teams working abroad, 
emergency humanitarian aid, overseas volunteer programs, and debt relief.137 
After parsing AidData’s database with these specific modes of Chinese aid, I was 
able to assign a total value of Chinese aid extended toward the Philippines. From 2000–
2012, I estimated total Chinese delivered aid to the Philippines to be $588.6 million 
compared to $1.06 billion delivered to Cambodia over the same time period.138 As a 
large, populous, lower-middle income country that is so geographically close to China, 
we should expect to see greater flows of Chinese aid to the Philippines. Similar to an 
examination of total trade balances, it is difficult to tie sweeping generalities of total 
value of aid flows to coercive governmental economic policy. However,—similar to my 
study of specific periods of retardation of Chinese import of Philippine products—there 
appear to be specific periods when China tightly restricted its flow of aid to the 
Philippines. Those periods coincide with the aforementioned periods of conflict between 
Manila and Beijing, adding to the evidence of Chinese coercive economic policy.  
A closer examination of Chinese aid flows to the Philippines renders a useful 
observation: China seems to have restricted aid flows to the Philippines whenever it was 
involved in a dispute with the Philippines. Specifically, China’s humanitarian aid lent to 
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the Philippines during Super Typhoon Yolanda in 2013 raised eyebrows as it appears to 
be tied to China’s clash with the Philippines the year prior. In November 2013 category 
five typhoon Yolanda tore through the Philippines, becoming the deadliest storm in 
Philippine history. Yolanda was responsible for the death of 6,300 Filipinos and damages 
amounting to PhP 89.6 billion, approximately $2.1 billion in 2011 figures.139 The 
international community was quick to rush to Manila’s aid. Australia pledged $28 million 
in cash and materials. The United States pledged $37 million in cash and materials while 
dispatching military assets in a HADR mission named Operation Damayan; Japan also 
pledged $10 million toward the relief efforts. The Swedish corporation Ikea even pledged 
$2.7 million through a customer-match campaign.140 China’s initial pledge of support 
totaled an embarrassingly meager $100,000. After wide-spread international criticism, 
China supplemented its original $100,000 donation with a separate $100,000 contribution 
from the Chinese Red Cross and $1.4 million in supplies such as tents and blankets. In 
total, China contributed $1.6 million.141142 The snub is believed to be a result of China’s 
clash with the Philippines over the Scarborough Shoal in 2012; but as is the case with 
China’s use of other exploitative economic levers, Beijing never admitted that its 
withholding of aid was the result of its dispute with the Philippines—serving as further 
evidence of China’s veiled, coercive economic policy.143 
E. CIRCUMSTANTIAL 
In each of the aforementioned scenarios, China did not overtly express any 
economic policy changes as a result of conflict with the Philippines. This coincides with 
the prevailing idea that China veils its economic policy, leaving countries to deduce 
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whether changes in trade pattern or development assistance cash flows are the result of a 
political conflict with China. As noted earlier, Ravindran defines economic coercion as 
“the deliberate, government-inspired withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of customary 
trade or financial relations.”144 I have used the preceding scenarios to demonstrate 
instances when Beijing appears to deliberately withdraw trade and finance relations, but 
there are many other circumstantial economic factors that Manila must consider before 
taking political action at home or abroad. Each of these factors represents a method by 
which Beijing extorts and influences the Philippines. I will address some of these factors 
here. 
1. Large Volume Buyers 
Part of the power that China wields over emerging countries like the Philippines 
exists simply because in a global market, large volume buyers hold extortion potential 
over small volume sellers. Ravindran wrote that when considering the variables 
associated with economic sanctions, we should consider “cost imposed on the target, 
trade linkages between the target and the sender, relative economic size, economic health 
and political stability of the target, the type of sanctions used, and cost to the sender.”145 
Together, these pieces of information paint the picture that the Philippines is ripe for 
political exploitation from China’s political economy. Whether or not China actually uses 
this lever is irrelevant. A large portion of Chinese foreign policy is based on veiling its 
threat and simply eliciting political responses because it holds the economic upper hand. 
In this section, I will further analyze the Philippine-Chinese economic relationship to 
demonstrate such.  
Large volume buyers have substantial influence over small volume sellers; the 
Philippine-Chinese economic relationship is the epitome of this dynamic.146 Chinese 
exports to the Philippines are meager when compared to the total of Chinese exports, but 
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China accounts for a large portion of Philippine exports.147 Bilateral economic ties 
between the Philippines and China have blossomed over the years, and by 2012 China 
became the Philippines third-largest trading partner.148 Bilateral trade between the two 
grew from USD $874 million in 1995 to USD $2.7 billion in 2002 to USD $12.6 billion 
in 2011.149 This trade is unbalanced and that imbalance has been exacerbated as the total 
value of trade has increased. In 2011, Philippine exports as a percentage of GDP totaled 
49.68 percent, Philippine trade with China as a percentage of GDP totaled 5.6 percent, 
Philippine trade with China as a percentage of total trade totaled 11.28 percent, and 
Philippine exports to China as a percentage of total exports equated to 12.7 percent.150 
When comparing this data to Chinese exports to the Philippines, we get a sense of the 
trade imbalance and the potential for exploitation becomes apparent. In 2011, Chinese 
total trade with the Philippines as a percentage of total trade amounted to just 0.89 
percent; Chinese exports to the Philippines as a percentage of total exports totaled merely 
0.75 percent; Chinese imports from the Philippines as a as percentage of total imports 
amounted to 1.03 percent; and Chinese FDI to the Philippines as a percentage of total 
outgoing FDI amounted to 0.3 percent.151 
As demonstrated with the trade linkage data, close economic ties with China are 
absolutely critical to the Philippine economy but the inverse is not necessarily true. 
During a period of slow economic growth in 2011, Chinese foreign direct investment was 
absolutely indispensable to the Philippines. In the first half of 2011, USD $33 million of 
Chinese investments propped up the Philippine economy during an economic downturn. 
Similarly, Philippine President Aquino’s administration negotiated contracts with four 
Chinese mining companies in that same year that will bring USD $14 billion in 
investment to the Philippines by 2016.152 China holds the position of power in its 
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bilateral economic relationship with the Philippines, and the Philippines must consider 
this fact when making policy decisions. 
2. Wealthy Ethnic Chinese in the Philippines 
Ethnic Chinese have a large presence in the Philippines. Filipinos with Chinese 
ancestry—Sangleys—make up roughly 25 percent of the population while 2 million 
Filipinos with pure Chinese ancestry make up 2.5 percent of the population.153 Sangleys 
occupy many positions of political and economic significance in the Philippines, and 
Beijing could attempt to influence Manila’s policy decisions through some of these 
positions.  
The Philippines’ richest family is headed by Mr. Henry Sy. Sy moved to the 
Philippines from China 1936 and has established an economic empire since then. His 
family was worth USD $13.2 billion in 2013, building a 30 percent stake in the National 
Grid Corporation of the Philippines. China holds a 40 percent stake in the company. 
Additionally, the Sy family owns a majority share of the China Banking Corporation—
the fourth largest Philippine bank—and owns the real estate company SM Prime that 
makes roughly 10 percent of its profits from construction contracts in China.154 There are 
several wealthy, high profile ethnic Chinese in the Philippines that could be used by 
China to influence Philippine politics. While we have not witnessed such extortion to 
date, the prevailing thought in academics and politics is that there is exploitation potential 
in these relationships.155 
F. ANALYSIS 
This chapter has offered empirical evidence on three specific levers that China 
uses to extort policy concessions from the Philippines: trade balances, overt 
governmental economic sanctions, and aid restriction. There have been situations where 
specific Chinese economic policy seems to be tied to conflict with the Philippines—such 
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as economic sanctions after the 2012 conflict with the Philippines over the Scarborough 
Shoal. Moreover, China clearly holds the economic upper hand in its bilateral economic 
relationship with the Philippines. China uses both of these means to extort favorable 
policy decisions in the Philippines, but it rarely admits such actions explicitly. When it 
does—like its veiled threats during the 2010 Nobel award—the threats remain vague. 
While vague, China’s attempts at economic exploitation seem to be effective when 
dealing with emerging nations such as the Philippines. In 2010, China’s threats prevented 
21 countries from attending the award ceremony for the Nobel Peace Prize—including 
the Philippines. Additionally, China’s fruit embargo and tourism restrictions seem to 
have dislodged its stand off with the Philippines over the Scarborough Shoal in 2012. 
After weeks of standoff, in June 2012 the Philippines agreed to a mutual withdrawal of 
all vessels in the contested lagoon. Days later, Chinese fishers returned to the lagoon and 
PLA-N vessels took up positions to block the entrance of the lagoon.156 Chinese 
occupancy remains the status quo today. 
China’s use of economic coercion is targeted, calculated, and opaque. In this 
environment, the targets of what is potentially coercive Chinese economic policy are left 
to deduce whether or not China is using coercive economic policy after sudden economic 
or trade policy changes. In these cases, what really matters is not Chinese signaling or 
intentions, but the perceptions of those affected by such changes.157 I have established a 
pattern for Chinese economic coercion when dealing with more advanced developing 
countries such as the Philippines: vague threats, targeted sanctions at the microeconomic 
level, and broader import restrictions at the macroeconomic level. Together, these three 
prongs make a compelling argument: that China uses coercive economic policies to extort 
political concessions from developed countries. In 2015, the Philippines petitioned the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration to examine and rule on China’s nine-dash line claims in 
the South China Sea; the court ruled that it holds jurisdiction and is currently arbitrating 
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the case.158 This type of petition is indicative of the type of provocation that has 
historically elicited a coercive economic response from Beijing. It will be important to 
watch for China’s economic response in future study over the coming years. 
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III. CAMBODIA: A PICTURE OF COOPERATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
With an understanding of how China uses coercive economic policy to elicit 
policy concessions from more advanced developing nations such as the Philippines, my 
study shifted to understanding how China uses cooperative economic policy when 
dealing with lesser developed countries like Cambodia. I hypothesize that when China is 
dealing with poorer, underdeveloped countries—such as Cambodia—it seeks to prop up 
its image as a benevolent power through the use of win-win economics. This chapter 
characterizes China’s economic relationship with Cambodia as cooperative, arguing that 
this relationship exemplifies China’s relationship with lesser developed countries. In that 
effort, I will define the methods by which China delivers aid to Cambodia thereby 
demonstrating China’s cooperative economic policy aimed at creating a win-win 
economic system and the policy concessions it receives in response. 
B. BILATERAL TRADE: FRAMING THE ARGUMENT 
Bilateral trade between Cambodia and China has dramatically increased; in 2012, 
total trade between the two nations totaled $2.35 billion, making China Cambodia’s 
largest trading partner.159 While Philippine trade seems to be diverse, Cambodian trade is 
much more reliant on China. The implication here is that China does not need to use such 
coercive economic levers that it uses with more developed nations. The result is a 
Chinese economic policy that is built on rewarding policy concessions with economic 
carrots. Extension of Chinese aid is the tool used by Beijing in this regard. Such a policy 
is successful for two reasons: it plays into China’s narrative as a benevolent power that 
rewards favorable domestic and international policy decisions in lesser developed 
nations; and Chinese aid is especially coveted by developing nations. In the following 
passages, I will detail how China qualifies its aid packages before I quantify the total 
value of Chinese aid extended to Cambodia and the policy concessions that Phnom Penh 
grants to Beijing as a result.  
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C. DEFINING AID 
A discussion on levels of Chinese aid must be prefaced by a definition of Chinese 
aid. Establishing such a definition presents several challenges, most significant of which 
is a notable difference when comparing the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development’s Development Assistance Committee’s (OECD-DAC) definition of aid to 
the Chinese definition. The OECD-DAC has two categories for aid: Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) and Official Development Finance (ODF). The OECD 
defines ODA as “grants or loans to countries and territories…which are: a) undertaken by 
the official sector; b) with promotion of economic development and welfare as the main 
objective; c) at concessional financial terms.”160 The OECD-DAC specifically mentions 
that grants and loans “for military purposes are excluded.”161 It defines ODF as bilateral 
ODA, grants, concessional and non-concessional developmental lending, and other 
financial flows “which have too low a grant element to qualify as ODA.”162 
The PRC does not provide as clear a definition of what it considers to constitute 
aid. In a 2014 white paper, the PRC’s Information Office of the State Council classified 
Chinese aid as either a grant, an interest-free loan, or a concessional loan. It explains that 
grants are issued to “help recipients build small or medium-sized social welfare projects, 
and to fund human resources development cooperation, technical cooperation, material 
assistance and emergency humanitarian aid.”163 The Information Office explains that 
interest-free loans are granted “to help recipient countries construct public facilities and 
launch projects to improve people’s livelihood.”164 Finally, the office explains that 
concessionary loans are generally granted to “help recipient countries undertake 
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manufacturing projects and large and medium-sized infrastructure projects with 
economic and social benefit.”165  
These explanations are a clear break from the specific definitions used by the 
OECD-DAC. While the OECD-DAC uses specific language to define what does and 
does not constitute aid, the PRC’s Information Office makes broad, sweeping remarks to 
explain the cases in which it distributes aid. This leads to a broader discussion on the 
difficulty of interpreting Chinese aid data. In their analysis of the published information 
of Chinese external financial flows, Sven Grimm, Rachel Rank, Matthew McDonald, and 
Elizabeth Schickerling wrote, “the official Chinese understanding of what constitutes aid 
differs from OECD-DAC definitions for reporting.”166 This presents a problem in 
determining the type of data to collect for my research. In addition, the destinations and 
volume of Chinese aid is typically shrouded in secrecy. By Grimm et al’s account, “Aid 
figures are still a sensitive issue in China, as in other countries, but more so in China 
because of cultural traditions and philosophy.” Free aid faces philosophical and domestic 
pressures in the PRC as much developmental assistance is still needed in the PRC while 
free handouts are philosophically complicated by the claimed “mutual benefit” of South-
South cooperation.167 As a result, the CCP shrouds the location and volume of its aid 
programs in secrecy, making such data more difficult to interpret and contributing to 
suspicion among OECD-DAC nations. 
Regardless, I still need to classify the differences in these two organizations’ 
reporting methods and explain which data I will use for this research. Perhaps the starkest 
difference between the two agencies is the classification of military aid. The OECD-DAC 
does not include such data in its aid figures; the PRC does.168 Such different reporting 
requirements make comparison of data difficult and a careful explanation for the 
selection of data in any comparative study necessary. Going forward, I will use the PRC’s 
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definition of aid to quantify and qualify my research. Understanding that such broad, 
loose, and sweeping definitions as used by the Information Office present challenges in 
the quantification of data, I still believe it the best lens through which to understand and 
explain destinations and volumes of Chinese aid. After consulting both the PRC’s white 
paper on its foreign aid and a report on the same by Grimm et al., I decided to use the 
following modalities to define Chinese aid: complete projects, goods and materials, 
technical cooperation, Chinese medical teams working abroad, emergency humanitarian 
aid, overseas volunteer programs, and debt relief.169 Each of these eight modalities falls 
into one of three categories that the PRC uses to classify its aid—grants, interest free 
loans, and concessional loans. Moving forward, I will attempt to use these classifications 
and modalities to quantify flows of Chinese aid to Cambodia. 
D. MODALITIES OF AID 
Using these eight modalities of Chinese aid, I searched primary news sources for 
instances of extension of Chinese aid to Cambodia to both provide context to my study 
and to assist in assigning a figure to the total value of such during the period of my study. 
The following passages provide examples of those extensions. 
1. Introduction 
“Flush with nearly a trillion dollars in hard currency reserves and eager for stable 
friends in Southeast Asia, China is making big loans for big projects to countries that 
used to be the sole preserve of the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the United 
States and Japan,” wrote Jane Perlez in her New York Times article of 2006.170 It has 
been well documented that Chinese aid is claimed to come without “imposing any 
political conditions, not interfering in the internal affairs of the recipient countries and 
fully respecting their right to independently [choose] their own paths and models of 
development.”171 Such strings-free aid packages are enticing to LDCs, and Chinese aid to 
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such countries in the region has increased as a result. In this case study, I will examine 
the economic relationship and quantity of aid traveling to Phnom Penh from Beijing 
using the aforementioned modalities and categories. I will then attempt to quantify total 
aid from Beijing to China. Finally, I will describe the impact that Chinese aid has on its 
relationship with Cambodia. 
2. Complete Projects 
Chinese aid in the form of complete projects is defined as any project that is 
planned, completed, and financed overseas with Chinese assistance.172 In spring 2006, 
Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao and Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen announced 
a $600 million joint modernization project in Phnom Penh that would consist of two 
bridges, a hydropower plant, and a fiber-optic network. This project was touted as being 
strings-free, and is significant for Cambodia.173 Together with other promised Chinese-
funded hydroelectric dams along the Mekong River inside of Cambodian territory, these 
projects will triple Cambodia’s energy output to 4,000 megawatts by 2020.174 China has 
also funded financing and labor for several government buildings in Cambodia, including 
the Senate headquarters in 1999 and the Council of Ministers building—a $39 million 
grant to Cambodia in 2005.175 As another example of Chinese aid to Cambodia in this 
modality, in 2012 China announced that Wen Jiabao and Hun Sen agreed on a $2 billion 
Chinese project in the coastal city of Kep. The project was centered on an industrial park 
that would house a steel mill, a power plant, a seaport, and other supporting 
infrastructure.176 Accompanying the $2 billion project, the two countries announced that 
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China had agreed to extend a $500 million loan to Cambodia for the development of 
needed irrigation systems and other infrastructure improvements in the country.177 
3. Goods and Materials 
The goods and materials portion of Chinese aid are usually linked to joint project 
ventures, which benefits Chinese companies as well as aid recipients.178 In 2005, the 
Xinhua News Agency announced a donation of “1,500 extension meters of ZB200 beret 
steel bridges, four bulldozers, four graders, six road rollers, one vibratory road roller and 
their spare parts” to Cambodia totaling USD $10.1 million.179 Likewise in May 2015, the 
Xinhua News Agency announced the donation of vehicles and spare parts for a 
Cambodian training program in auto repair. The agency reported that the PRC donated 44 
different types of vehicles, “20 elevators, 4 kitchen trailers, spare parts, and materials for 
an automotive workshop” as reported by Cambodia’s Deputy Prime Minister, Tea 
Banh.180 On June 5, 2013 Chinese Ambassador to Cambodia Pan Guangxue and 
Cambodian Minister of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries signed a handover certificate 
in Phnom Penh for a donation of agricultural goods. The supplies included a delivery of 
tractors and plows to the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville.181 
4. Technical Cooperation 
In its white paper, the PRC’s Information Office claims that “China shares its 
experience and technology with other developing countries through human resources and 
technical cooperation, as well as through volunteer service, to help other developing 
countries build their own professional teams and enhance their capacity for independent 
development.”182 There are several examples of such aid from China to Cambodia. In 
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2005, Chinese Ambassador to Cambodia Hu Qianwen signed an agreement with 
Cambodian Foreign Minister Hor Namhong at the Cambodian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs with the Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen in attendance. In the agreement, 
China pledged to provide technical experts in assisting the Cambodian Finance Ministry 
while also promising a $6.25 billion grant and $6.25 billion interest-free loan.183 At the 
ceremony, Hor thanked the CCP for its continued support of Cambodia, saying “the new 
assistance is another testimony to the growing excellent relationship and cooperation 
between Cambodia and China.”184 
Additionally, in 2005 Chinese Vice-Premier Zeng Peiyan and Cambodian 
Minister of Urbanization and Construction Im Chhun Lim announced that China would 
share technical expertise in city planning and construction toward the goal of housing 
system reform in Cambodia. The announcement was accompanied by a blanket pledge of 
Chinese technical and administrative experts to conduct personnel training in Cambodia 
to assist with Cambodian development.185 
5. Chinese Medical Teams Working Abroad 
According to the Information Office’s white paper, in 2014 “China dispatched 55 
teams composed of 3,600 medical personnel to 54 countries to provide stationed or 
touring medical services, treating nearly seven million patients.”186 The white paper is 
vague on specifics, but references that from 2003 onward, China dispatched medical 
teams “to provide free surgery for patients with eye diseases in the DPRK, Cambodia, 
Bangladesh, Vietnam, Pakistan and other Asian countries..”187 A search through state 
news archives and other aid databases reveals several other examples. In 2005, for 
example, China dispatched a medical team to Cambodia to assist in the treatment of an 
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outbreak of Enterovirus 71 (EV71)—an intestinal virus that is infamous for its connection 
to neurological disorders in children.188 The four-person medical team consisted of 
experts from the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention as well as Beijing’s 
Children’s Hospital. The medical team established a base for operations in Phnom Penh 
in July 2005 and agreed to assist Cambodian health officials with the analysis and 
treatment of the virus and those it infected.189 
6. Emergency Humanitarian Aid 
The PRC’s 2011 official policy paper on China’s foreign aid provided fairly clear 
parameters for its extension of aid for humanitarian relief purposes. It stated, “Emergency 
humanitarian aid is provided when a country or region suffers a severe natural or 
humanitarian disaster. In such cases, China provides materials, or cash for emergency 
relief or dispatches relief personnel…to reduce losses of life and property in disaster-
stricken areas.”190 The 2014 iteration of the same document goes on to claim that from 
2010–2012, the PRC “extended 1.5 billion yuan worth of materials and cash assistance in 
emergency humanitarian aid to more than 30 countries.”191 Cambodia has been an 
especially major benefactor of this modality of aid. In December 2000, Chinese 
Ambassador Ning Fukui announced in a ceremony with Cambodian Foreign Minister 
Hor Namhong that China would donate flood relief goods worth 5 million yuan.192 
Similarly, in October 2011, China donated medicine, mosquito nets, blankets, towels, 
medical supplies and equipment and other miscellaneous flood-relief goods to Cambodia 
in response to wide-spread flooding that year. The goods delivery was one of several 
deliveries in that same month totaling 50 million yuan.193 During the exchange ceremony 
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in Phnom Penh, Cambodian Vice President of the National Committee for Disaster 
Management Nhim Vanda said, “China is the largest relief aid donor to Cambodia…. On 
behalf of the government of Cambodia and Cambodian people, I would like to express 
sincere thanks to the government of China…and I wish the friendship and cooperation 
between Cambodia and China to be stronger and to last forever.”194 During a similar 
ceremony in 2014, China again delivered relief goods to Cambodia for the relief of flood 
victims after devastating floods in the Mekong River Valley between August and October 
2013 that killed 168 people and caused $1 billion in damages across the region according 
to the Cambodian National Committee for Disaster Management.195 After the $1 million 
donation of relief goods, Cambodian Red Cross President—the wife of Prime Minister 
Hun Sen—said, “China is Cambodia’s elder brother and always helps Cambodia in all 
difficult times…. The Cambodian people will have never forgotten this humanitarian 
assistance.”196 
7. Overseas Volunteer Programs 
Not much detail is given in the Information Office’s white paper regarding the 
overseas volunteer program. The 2011 iteration revealed that the program is used in 
“education, medical, and health care and some other social sectors.”197 “By the end of 
2009,” the report claimed, “China had dispatched to 19 developing countries…some 405 
young volunteers.”198 In Cambodia, these volunteer efforts are intensely focused on the 
promotion of Chinese culture and language in Cambodia. Starting in 2010 and continuing 
ever since, China’s Office of Chinese Language Council International has sent volunteer 
teachers to “build the quality of Chinese language education in Cambodia.”199 In 2011, 
China dispatched 58 volunteers to teach in 22 Chinese schools throughout Cambodia. 
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Along with boosting the quality of Chinese linguistic and cultural education in 
Cambodia, the program focuses on improving “traditional friendship ties between 
Chinese and Cambodians,” stated Wei Ning, an official of Consular Affairs at the 
Chinese Embassy in Phnom Penh.200 
8. Debt Relief 
In the 2014 report on China’s foreign aid, the PRC’s Information Office wrote 
that during 2014, “China relieved nine LDCs and heavily indebted poor countries…from 
16 mature interest-free loans totaling 1.42 billion Yuan.”201 Cambodia has been the 
recipient of such debt forgiveness in the past. In 2010, Cambodia’s Minister of Finance 
Keat Chhon and China’s Chairman of the Standing Committee for the National People’s 
Congress Wu Bangguo signed an agreement that forgave a $200 million debt owed by 
Cambodia to China.202 Similarly, in 2002 Beijing announced that it was set to forgive all 
debt owed by Cambodia. While neither Beijing nor Phnom Penh elaborated on the size of 
the debt that was forgiven, the Phnom Penh Post estimated at the time that Cambodia’s 
debt to China was in excess of $210 million.203 
E. TOTALING CHINESE AID TO CAMBODIA 
While it is one thing to find examples where China extended aid packages and 
programs to Cambodia, it is more difficult to put a total dollar value on all such packages 
and programs extended to Cambodia over a specific interval. Due to the aforementioned 
domestic and ideological pressures and complications, the PRC rarely releases specific 
values on the aid it extends, let alone cumulative data on the sum of aid projects. After 
consulting several databases, I decided that AidData’s open database for international 
development to be of the most utility for my research. According to the organization’s 
website, “AidData collects, curates, and publishes data on more than $5.5 trillion dollars 
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in development finance from 90 bilateral and multilateral agencies at the project 
level.”204 In an effort to “improve development outcomes by making development 
finance data more accessible and actionable,” the organization makes its database of 
more than one million development finance activities that totals more than $40 trillion 
searchable and accessible to the public. The organization began as a partnership of three 
different academic institutions—The College of William and Mary, Development 
Gateway, and Brigham Young University—and is committed to making raw data 
available, facilitating the analysis of the data for academics and policymakers alike. 
After settling on the database I filtered the search results by instances of Chinese 
aid extensions to Cambodia. Each individual result had independent sources validating 
the entry, and in each instance possible, the organization attached a dollar figure to each 
entry in terms of 2009 U.S. dollars. I checked each entry and validated each reference to 
the best of my capability, adding up the total value of all entries from 2000–2012. This 
was the extent of the organization’s database and I decided to use the largest sample size 
in an attempt to increase the accuracy of my data. After going through the database and 
totaling the data, I came up with a figure of $21,207,222,093.92 that represents the sum 
of pledged Chinese aid to Cambodia from 2000–2012. There does exist a significant gap 
between Chinese pledged aid and delivered aid, especially in East Asia. In a 2013 report 
on China’s foreign aid by Charles Wolf Jr., Xiao Wang, and Eric Warner, they detail that 
between 2001–2011, Chinese delivered aid to East Asia—a region they classify as 
including Cambodia—only matched pledged aid at a 5 percent rate.205 The chief reason 
for this discrepancy was the allocation of the aid. Chinese pledged aid in the region 
during the time period was dominated by large infrastructure and natural resource 
extraction projects. Such grandiose projects are slow developing, provide ample windows 
for the actual delivery of the pledged aid, provide many opportunities for renegotiation of 
aid, and are occasionally abandoned.206 
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I used the general 5 percent rate at which pledged aid was delivered to East Asian 
countries from China to parse the data from AidData, as it proved too difficult to identify 
which of the projects were delayed, abandoned, or had reentered negotiation. I recognize 
that this sweeping generalization is not the most accurate solution, but I believe the 
results to be sufficient for my study. 
After applying the 5 percent limiter to the sum of $21.2 billion Chinese pledged 
aid to Cambodia from 2000–2012, I arrived at my estimated figure of total aid delivered 
to Cambodia from China during the same period— $1,060,361,104.70 in 2009 USD. 
After arriving at this total, I had to adjust for inflation from 2009 to 2015. To do so, I 
used the following equation: 
Rp  Hp * CPIHistorical / CPICurrent   
In this equation, Rp is the real price after inflation and Hp is the historical price. I 
used the U.S. Bureau of Labor statistics for the 2009 average CPI of 214.537 and the 
unadjusted annual average for 2015 CPI of 236.525.207 With this methodology, I 
calculated the estimated value of all Chinese aid delivered to Cambodia from 2000–2012 
to be $961,787,085.17 after inflation. It is clear that financial aid flow from China to 
Cambodia is steadily increasing, and the trajectory of the Chinese-Cambodian 
relationship seems to mirror the trajectory of increased financial aid flow from Beijing to 
Phnom Penh. Having explained the trajectory of increased financial aid flow, I will next 
detail the trajectory of the relationship between China and Cambodia. 
F. THE IMPACT OF CHINESE AID ON CAMBODIAN RELATIONS  
In short, the Chinese-Cambodian relationship is on a steady rise. To exemplify 
this, I focus on examining both the general trajectory of this relationship and China’s 
specific aims at building Cambodian support in China’s territorial disputes with other 
ASEAN nations in the South China Sea. 
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1. General Trajectory 
Historically, China’s relationship with Cambodia has been based on mistrust as a 
result of China’s support for the communist Khmer Rouge government during the 
1970s.208 In more recent times, though, the two countries have upgraded the title of their 
bilateral relationship to a “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership of Cooperation.”209 The 
two countries have increased their economic cooperation as a result. Trade has increased 
between the two nations—jumping to $3.3 billion in 2013 from $2.35 billion in 2012—
and both countries have pledged to increase their trade to a target of $5 billion by 
2017.210 The cooperation between the two countries has recently expanded into the 
defense sphere. In 2012, China pledged a $17 million grant to Cambodia for the building 
of military hospitals and professional military education establishments for the Royal 
Cambodian Armed Forces.211 In 2013 Cambodia used one of its Chinese loans to 
purchase 12 Harbin Z-9 helicopters, and in 2014 Cambodia received a donation of 26 
trucks and military uniforms from China.212 In May 2015 China delivered 44 military 
vehicles ranging from forklifts to mobile rocket launchers to Cambodia.213  
The military relationship between the two countries has evolved beyond the 
Chinese supply of military equipment to Cambodia. Recent events support that claim. In 
July 2015 a delegation consisting of 23 high-ranking Cambodian defense officials arrived 
in Beijing for a five-day conference. Despite both countries’ best efforts to downplay the 
significance of the visit, analysts noted that the highest ranking officers from each branch 
of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces was in attendance.214 Phnom Penh and Beijing 
refused to disclose the nature of the visit besides labeling it an effort to “further enhance 
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bilateral ties and cooperation,” but the ongoing border dispute between Cambodia and 
Vietnam have led many to speculate the true meaning of the visit.215 Chinese-Cambodian 
relations have grown to such depth that they are now considered to be one of China’s key 
partners in Southeast Asia. With this in mind, analysts raised their collective eyebrows in 
July 2015 when Cambodian Foreign Minister Hor Namhong suggested that Cambodia 
could serve as a mediator in the growing dispute between China and several ASEAN 
states regarding territorial claims in the South China Sea.216 
2. Buying Support in the South China Sea Disputes 
The 2012 ASEAN summit was marred by controversy. The revolving 
chairmanship of the summit rested with Cambodia for the year, and ASEAN members’ 
South China Sea disputes with China was on the top of many national agendas. One of 
the top priorities of the summit was to agree to a legally binding code of conduct. 
ASEAN was unable to reach that consensus, failing to even establish a joint communique 
for the first time in the organization’s history.217 Since ASEAN requires consensus 
before any major policy decisions or the publication of joint statements, Cambodia was 
solely able to block both the Code of Conduct and the joint communique.218 At the center 
of the discord is the issue of dispute resolution between China and other ASEAN states. 
States with a dispute with China—namely the Philippines and Vietnam—want to address 
these issues multilaterally in an international forum. China, preferring to wield its 
influence over individual states, demands that disputes be resolved bilaterally.  
By contrast, the support for ASEAN multilateral negotiation is overwhelming. 
Philippine President Aquino spoke for the majority after the summit in 2012: “Not to be 
flippant about it, if you cross your national borders then it becomes an international 
situation. And if the solution will come through the international tribunal of the laws of 
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the sea, that makes it another a new entity… Our position has always been that a 
multilateral problem does not lend itself to a solution on a bilateral basis.”219 Cambodia 
is the only ASEAN member that dissents from this view. Cambodia’s viewpoint is that 
ASEAN is not the place to air territorial disputes, and that such disputes should be 
handled bilaterally between China and the other disputing parties. At the summit in 2012, 
Cambodian Foreign Affairs Secretary of State Soeung Rathchavy said, “Territorial claims 
in the South China Sea must be settled with countries involved... ASEAN can’t settle this 
dispute. We are not a legal institution.”220 As a country without a stake in the ongoing 
territorial disputes, this position seemed curious at best. Analysts were quick to cite 
Chinese aid as the reason for Cambodia’s peculiar position. In an interview with 
Cambodia daily, Pavin Chachavalpongpun, an associate professor at Kyoto University’s 
Center for Southeast Asian Studies said, “Cambodia’s foreign relations have been held 
hostage by its intimate ties with China and this limits its own foreign policy choices, thus 
causing a negative impact on its international image.”221  
The controversy did not end after this debacle in July. In November 2012, 
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao joined a closed-door meeting with the ten other ASEAN 
prime ministers to further discuss ASEAN’s role in territorial disputes. After the meeting, 
Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen emerged claiming that ASEAN had reached 
consensus that the South China Sea disputes would not be “internationalized.”222 China 
was quick to publicly agree with this statement. Qin Gang, a spokesman for the Chinese 
delegation at the meeting publicly stated, “I have to say the ASEAN countries have 
reached a consensus—have reached a common position—which has been expressed by 
Prime Minister Hun Sen on behalf of ASEAN.”223 Yet such a consensus was never 
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reached, and the Philippines and Vietnam were quick to voice their objection and 
frustration. President Aquino again spoke for the opposition. He said, “We don’t think 
there is a consensus… We stated that we deserve the right to protect our national 
interests.”224 The issue stands unresolved. Because of Cambodia’s objection, a decision 
on ASEAN’s role in these disputes remains undecided as consensus among the ASEAN 
states is required before such a decision can be made.225 
Considering Cambodia’s stance against “internationalizing” the South China Sea 
disputes, comments from Cambodian foreign minister Hor Namhong were especially 
peculiar in July 2015 when he offered his country’s assistance in mediating the disputes 
between China and other SCS claimants. In an interview with Voice of America, he said, 
“Cambodia wants to mediate in order to reduce the tense atmosphere between ASEAN 
and China because we discern that no solution can be found without talking to each 
other.”226 This marks a clear shift in Cambodia’s position on the SCS disputes, and is 
even more peculiar considering that Hor Namhong presided over the failed ASEAN 
summit in 2012.227 Despite the country’s shift in policy at this juncture, this position 
would benefit China just as much as Cambodia’s previous position. A weak mediator in 
such a dispute would be unable to stem Chinese demands; such a position would be 
difficult for even a more robust ASEAN member. Furthermore, it seems unreasonable to 
assume that such negotiations would be fruitful for claimants other than China since 
Cambodia seems so close in its relationship with the PRC.228 
ASEAN’s role in this dispute remains in the forefront of policymaking challenges 
today. In January, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry met with Cambodian Prime 
Minister Hun Sen, urging his regime to take a more vigorous stance with other ASEAN 
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states against Chinese territorial encroachments.229 Cambodian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Hor Namhong announced that Cambodia’s stance on the issue remains 
unchanged. Cambodia stands by its position that states with territorial disputes with 
China should seek to resolve those disputes bilaterally.230 
The highest levels of Chinese aid to Cambodia were seen from 2011–2012, when 
Cambodia appeared to push Beijing’s agenda within ASEAN. The year 2011 pledged aid 
to Cambodia from China was ten times greater than that from the United States to 
Cambodia.231 Returning to the total sum of Chinese aid to Cambodia from 2000–2012 
and comparing the portion of that aid that was promised from 2011–2012 is startling. 
From 2000–2012, Beijing pledged $21,207,222,093.92 to Cambodia according to data I 
compiled from AidData.232 During the two-year span from 2011–2012, China pledged 
$4,058,449,391.95 in aid—approximately 20 percent of the total aid pledged to 
Cambodia over the entire twelve-year period of my study. 
G. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
Through this case study, I have demonstrated that China is using a cooperative 
economic strategy—specifically aid packages—to encourage Cambodia to take up 
China’s position in Cambodia’s sphere of influence. In this specific case, it appears that 
China looked to shore up support in an organization where it had very little. ASEAN 
nations were united against aggressive Chinese territorial expansion in the South China 
Sea. After clashes with China the year prior, the Philippines was motivated to address the 
issues in an international forum where it would be most insulated from China’s 
overbearing clout. It had the support of all other nations in developing a legal code of 
conduct, but Cambodia—motivated by Chinese aid—blocked the effort, resulting in a 
stalemate that remains unresolved today. In this cloudy state, China has pursued 
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aggressive land reclamation projects in the South China Sea. It is clear that Cambodia’s 
stonewalling of the other ASEAN states allowed China to pursue its territorial ambitions, 
and it appears that Cambodia was willing to do so because of China’s extension of aid 
packages. This provides us with a general template of Chinese economic policy: when 
dealing with lesser developed countries, China appears to use cooperative economic 
policy to elicit policy concessions. 
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IV. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
A. REVIEW OF FINDINGS 
This thesis has endeavored to answer the following question: How has China used 
economic policy to create leverage its relationships with its Asian neighbors? I 
hypothesized that China uses cooperative economic policy to woo policy concessions 
from its poorer, lesser developed neighbors while using coercive economic policy to 
extract similar concessions from its more advanced, emerging neighbors.  
Two of China’s neighbors served as case studies on China’s economic policy: 
Cambodia and the Philippines. In Cambodia, I discovered that China uses cooperative 
economic policy embodied by the extension of generous aid packages to Phnom Penh. 
The sustained extension of these aid packages have seriously impacted the Cambodian-
Chinese relationship. While the two countries were once suspicious rivals, today they are 
close allies. China uses this relationship to influence Cambodia’s actions in ASEAN. 
Cambodia has taken countless stances against the majority position of ASEAN nations 
that calls for multilateral resistance against China’s territorial encroachments in the South 
China Sea. With Cambodia acting as a Chinese proxy in the forum, ASEAN has been 
unable to approve any multilateral measures against China as the organization’s structure 
requires consensus among its members before such action. 
In the Philippines, China’s economic policy has been more covertly coercive. 
China has used targeted economic measures against Manila at critical junctures that 
correspond to periods of intense territorial disputes between the two countries. China’s 
arbitrary use of increases in phytosanitary standards dealt a blow to the critical Philippine 
banana export crop, its use of tourism restrictions had a deleterious impact to the 
Philippine tour industry, and its parsimonious use of aid after Typhoon Yolanda in the 
Philippines after the clash over the Scarborough Shoal are all patented examples of 
coercive economic policy that China has used in the past with its more developed 
neighbors. 
 60
Through my research on China’s relationship with these two countries, I proved 
my hypothesis to be correct and consistent with a popular thought today: that China uses 
both coercive and cooperative economic policy to achieve its regional objectives. Such 
findings are only as beneficial as their application, though. While it is helpful to 
understand Chinese patterns of economic policy, it is of more utility to use those patterns 
to guide American policy. In the coming passages I will suggest some implications of this 
research as they relate to American foreign policy, arguing that the United States must 
maintain multilateral engagement with ASEAN while strengthening bilateral 
relationships with the countries that are subject to Chinese coercive policy. Through this 
dedicated two-prong approach, both perfectly aligned with the Obama Administration’s 
rebalance to the Asia Pacific region, the United States can seek to minimize Beijing’s 
coercive influence in the region. As Elizabeth Economy wrote in her 2004 article, “U.S. 
policy cannot drive change in China by itself, but it can help provide the most supportive 
international context in which such change will thrive.”233 
B. MAINTAIN MULTILATERAL ENGAGEMENT WITH ASEAN 
A critical component of China’s strategy in the territorial disputes in the South 
China Sea with the ASEAN claimants is its adamant insistence on bilateral resolution. In 
such a framework, Beijing can best wield its economic power over its smaller neighbors 
in bilateral negotiations. The United States can counter this strategy by strengthening its 
multilateral engagement with ASEAN. This engagement has been a priority of American 
foreign policy since 2009. The following is a timeline that demonstrates the United 
States’ concerted efforts to become more deeply integrated with ASEAN. 
 In 2009, then U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton signed the Treaty on Amity 
and Cooperation with ASEAN, tying the United States to ASEAN’s goal of peace and 
prosperity for Southeast Asia.234 In a press conference in Thailand, Clinton declared, 
“The United States is back in Southeast Asia…. President Obama and I believe this 
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region is vital to global progress, peace and prosperity, and we are fully engaged with our 
ASEAN partners on the wide range of challenges confronting us.”235 
In 2010, the United States hosted the second U.S-ASEAN Leaders Meeting in 
New York, where the two announced the appointment of the first resident American 
ambassador to ASEAN in Jakarta.236 With this announcement, the United States became 
the first non-Asian nation to have a permanent ambassador recognized by ASEAN.237 In 
a joint statement after the summit, ASEAN acknowledged the “United States’ firm 
commitment to continue to strengthen comprehensive relations with ASEAN.”238 
Additionally, the two “agreed to further deepen our current partnership in order to 
provide the framework for continued growth in ASEAN-U.S. relations.”239 It was at this 
meeting that the two bodies committed to elevating their relationship to a level of 
strategic partnership. 
In 2012 at the fourth ASEAN-U.S. Leaders’ Meeting in Phnom Penh, ASEAN 
welcomed continued American engagement with ASEAN, agreeing to upgrade the 
Leaders’ Meeting to an annual ASEAN-U.S. Summit.240 In the joint statement, ASEAN 
trumpeted the United States increased economic engagement with ASEAN nations, 
highlighting the fact that trade between ASEAN and the United States increased 9.2 
percent from the previous year while FDI jumped 11.2 percent over the same time 
span.241 The United States and ASEAN announced the launch of the U.S.-ASEAN 
Expanded Economic Engagement initiative (E3), described as “a framework for 
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economic cooperation designed to expand trade and investment ties between the United 
States and ASEAN.”242 
In 2013, the United States reported promising returns of the initial efforts of the 
E3 initiative including continued work toward a U.S.-ASEAN trade facilitation 
agreement, the hosting of an Economic Ministers Road Show in the United States that 
brought ASEAN economic ministers and American government and business leaders to 
discuss ways to further develop economic ties, and the exchange of best practices and 
standards between ASEAN nations and the United States.243 
In November 2015, the Obama administration announced its crowning 
achievement in the deepening of U.S.-ASEAN ties: the elevation of their relationship to 
the level of strategic partnership. U.S. Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs Daniel Russel stated at a press conference, “We’re now ready to take our 
relationship with ASEAN to the next level.”244 While some were quick to dismiss the 
announcement as insignificant, the elevation of relations is important for two main 
reasons. First, it marks a shift in U.S.-ASEAN relations. While all efforts before were 
built on strengthening U.S.-ASEAN ties, as strategic partners the two would now work 
toward overlapping interests “on regional, global, and international issues.”245 In the joint 
statement announcing the elevation of relations, the two reaffirmed “the importance of 
maintaining peace and stability, ensuring maritime security and safety, and freedom of 
navigation including in and over-flight above the South China Sea.”246 The statement 
went on to reaffirm the United States and ASEAN’s commitment to UNCLOS, the 
Declaration of the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, and the resolution of 
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disputes in accordance with international institutions of law in a clear swipe at China.247 
In short, the elevation of relations enabled the United States and ASEAN to shift from 
strengthening their relationship to tackling the joint concern of Chinese aggressiveness in 
the South China Sea. Second, the elevation was considered an opportunity to codify 
progress in the relationship to that point. The Obama administration recognized the 
progress it had made in strengthening this relationship and wanted to lock in those returns 
as the American president neared the end of his second term. With the elevation of 
relations, the U.S.-ASEAN relationship took on a more permanent status, making it 
expected that the two would continue to look for ways to strengthen their relationship and 
increase cooperation.248  
In February 2016, President Obama hosted ASEAN leaders and the ASEAN 
Secretary-General for a summit in Rancho Mirage, California at the Sunnylands Ranch. 
This summit represented the first-ever standalone session of ASEAN leaders in the 
United States.249 The significance reaffirmed the Obama administration’s commitment to 
ASEAN while again signaling the importance of that relationship to his successor as his 
time in office neared an end. In the joint Sunnylands Declaration at the conclusion of the 
summit, the United States and ASEAN reaffirmed “the key principles that will guide our 
cooperation going forward.”250 The seventeen points that followed were centered around 
a singular objective: a “joint commitment to a rules-based order in the Asia-Pacific which 
is central to preserving regional peace, prosperity and progress.”251 Such a commitment 
is a direct challenge to China’s assertiveness in the region; the fact that three of the 
seventeen points that followed in the declaration concerned maritime security attests to 
that point.  
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The declaration also signaled the United States attempt to supplant Beijing’s 
economic grip on the region—a tool I demonstrated that it wields to coerce policy 
concessions from its neighbors. Toward this effort, the Sunnylands Declaration 
announced the establishment of the U.S.-ASEAN Connect initiative, a government 
initiative that will coordinate economic interaction and engagement between the United 
States and ASEAN members in three existing hubs: Jakarta, Bangkok, and Singapore.252 
At a press conference at the conclusion of the summit, President Obama announced the 
four pillars of the new initiative: Business Connect, Energy Connect, Innovation Connect, 
and Policy Connect.253 James Carouso, the U.S. State Department’s Director of Maritime 
Southeast Asia Affairs, explained the initiative as a central hub around which American 
actors can coordinate and market business to Southeast Asia as a direct alternative to 
China.254 
At the same press conference, President Obama announced the creation of various 
U.S.-ASEAN workshops that will help ASEAN states gain transparency regarding the 
Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) and will assist with reforms if individual states decide to 
pursue ascension.255 The importance of this initiative cannot be overstated. TPP is 
regarded largely as an East Asian initiative that largely excludes Southeast Asia, giving 
China room to exert its influence in the subregion. As of now, only four of ten ASEAN 
states are involved in TPP negotiations—Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam—but 
three others have indicated interest in joining the agreement—Indonesia, the Philippines, 
and Thailand. At the press conference, Obama pledged the United States’ dedication to 
ASEAN in this regard: “We’ve launched a new effort to help all ASEAN countries 
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understand the key elements of TPP, as well as the reforms that could eventually lead to 
them joining.”256 
Through a deepening multilateral integration with ASEAN, the Obama 
administration has taken two significant steps to undermining China’s coercive economic 
influence in the region. First, it has buttressed the principle of multilateral interaction 
with ASEAN in an environment where China seeks to maximize its influence by 
demanding bilateral dispute negotiation and resolution. Second, through economic 
engagement, the administration has provided an economic alternative to ASEAN states, 
supplanting China’s economic grip on the region. These initiatives are still new, so time 
will only tell if these initiatives will be successful. In that context, it is critical that the 
next administration elected must maintain its multilateral engagement with ASEAN. 
C. IMPROVING BILATERAL RELATIONS 
While the United States must support ASEAN by engaging with it on a 
multilateral level, it remains important for the United States to continue to strengthen its 
bilateral relationships with individual nations within ASEAN. Particularly, the United 
States must exercise this opportunity when observing Chinese attempts of economic 
coercion. In this specific case, the United States appears to have recognized this 
opportunity, taking concerted steps to strengthen ties with both the Philippines and 
Cambodia, thereby undermining China’s coercive economic influence. 
1. Engaging the Philippines 
While the United States has maintained a close relationship with the Philippines 
since the 1950s, the United States has demonstrated an interest in further strengthening 
that relationship in 2016. In April 2016, the United States committed 5,000 troops for 
Balikatan, a week-long bilateral training exercise in the Philippines that included a 
simulated amphibious assault and defense against a simulated assault on an oil rig. U.S. 
Defense Secretary Ash Carter visited the Philippines during Balikatan to observe the 
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drills.257 At a press conference during the event, Secretary Carter made a series of 
announcements that demonstrated the United States’ resolve to strengthen bilateral ties 
during a period when the Philippines faces coercive pressure from China. First, Carter 
announced the grant of $42 million in surveillance equipment to the Philippine Armed 
Forces to “help it track maritime activity and guard its borders amid rising tensions in the 
South China Sea.”258 Second, Secretary Carter announced a five-year, $425 million 
security deal that pledged $120 million of American military assistance to Manila in 2016 
alone—the largest amount of pledged American military aid to the Philippines since 
2000.259  
Finally, Carter announced the establishment of an “enhanced military alliance” 
between the United States and the Philippines. As part of the enhanced alliance, the 
United States pledged to increase the number of joint maritime patrols in the South China 
Sea, the forward deployment of American military aircraft at Clark Air Base, and the 
establishment of joint air patrols to supplement maritime patrols. Also, a part of this 
enhancement was a $42 million grant to improve infrastructure at five locations in the 
Philippines.260 Wrapping up the conference, Secretary Carter issued a relatively strong 
rebuke to China, tying ramped up American support of the Philippines directly to 
Beijing’s provocations: “There’s no question that there’s concern in the region about 
China’s behavior…. The U.S. values peaceful resolving of disputes. The U.S. values 
freedom of navigation. Countries that don’t stand for those things will be isolated. That is 
self-isolation, not isolation by us.”261 
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China’s coercive attempts at extortion with the Philippines has presented the 
United States with an opportunity to reaffirm its commitment to the Philippines. By 
enhancing its security alliance with the Philippines, the United States has taken steps to 
bolster the Philippines thereby decreasing its reliance on China and diminishing Beijing’s 
coercive potential. 
2. Engaging Cambodia 
China demonstrated its influence over Cambodian politics during the summer of 
2015 when Cambodia took up China’s position in the ASEAN fight over addressing 
Chinese territorial assertiveness. In the months that followed, the United States made a 
considerable effort to engage Phnom Penh in an effort to increase bilateral relations. In a 
January 2016 trip to Cambodia, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry championed the deep 
Cambodian-U.S. relationship. At a press conference, Kerry stated, “I think it’s quite 
remarkable that the United States is, in fact, Cambodia’s largest export market even 
though we have half the world between our countries…. And we will continue to explore 
ways to deepen our trade and investment relationship.”262 Kerry’s trumpeting of the 
United States role as Cambodia’s largest export market can be seen as a direct challenge 
to Beijing’s grip on Cambodia as a proxy in ASEAN that results from China’s economic 
investments in the country. As I have demonstrated, China’s grip on Cambodia is 
obvious. In the face of such observations, the United States should seek to increase 
bilateral relations with Cambodia in an attempt to undermine China’s economic influence 
over the country that it uses to extort policy decisions that advance its regional interests. 
It seems that the United States has recognized this as it has devoted considerable time and 
resources to increase interaction with Cambodia in an attempt to strengthen bilateral ties. 
a. 2012: Supporting Forestry and Biodiversity 
The United States has increased aid programs to Cambodia during Obama’s 
administration. In 2012 the United States announced the Supporting Forestry and 
Biodiversity Project (SFB), a $20 million initiative aimed to provide assistance to 
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Cambodia as it works to protect Cambodia’s deciduous forests that are vital to its 
economic prosperity—it is estimated that roughly 70 percent of Cambodians rely on 
agriculture and forestry for sustenance.263 Through SFB, the United States pledged to 
assist Cambodia as it fights to limit deforestation and promote biodiversity through a 
series of initiatives that will “improve the effectiveness of government and other key 
natural resource managers to sustainably manage forests.”264 In April 2016, American 
ambassador William Heidt joined Cambodian Environmental Minister Say Sam Al for an 
aerial tour of Cambodia’s more troubled forests. During Heidt’s visit, he pledged 
American satellite resources to Cambodia as Phnom Penh continues to fight illegal 
logging and rubber harvesting activities.265 Heidt also pledged continued American 
support to help Phnom Penh coordinate and focus its efforts.266 
b. 2013: Connecting the Mekong through Education and Training 
As part of the 2013 Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative, the United States 
launched the Connecting the Mekong through Education and Training (COMET) project. 
This five-year, $12.3 million initiative was created to improve the quality of the 
workforce in Cambodia and its Mekong neighbors by devoting resources to improve 
education across all levels from primary to post-secondary education.267 
c. 2016: Sustainable Mekong Initiative 
In March 2016, the United States announced a recommitment to the Sustainable 
Mekong Initiative (SMI). SMI is a four-year initiative designed to support Cambodia and 
other Mekong River nations through infrastructure development and construction by 
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providing Cambodia with “rapidly deployable technical assistance from the U.S. 
Government’s premier scientists and engineers.”268 A key component of SMI is the 
Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI). LMI was launched in 2009, but was brought under the 
auspices of SMI in 2016. LMI is designed to increase technical exchange between the 
Mekong River nations across six pillars of development: agriculture development, 
telecommunication connectivity, education development, energy security, environment 
protection, and health promotion.269 Since its creation, the United States has devoted 
more than $100 million to support LMI infrastructure and initiatives, while bilaterally 
donating $285 million in 2015 to LMI countries as they make advances in the six 
pillars.270 
D. MAINTAINING RELEVANCE 
As China continues to coercively wield its economic muscle in the region, the 
United States must maintain regional relevance. The United States seems to be doing so 
successfully through the Obama administration’s attempts to strengthen both its 
multilateral relationship with ASEAN and its bilateral ties wherever attempts of Chinese 
economic coercion are witnessed. Through its work with ASEAN over the past eight 
years, the current administration seems to be signaling to future administrations the 
significance of the region to American foreign policy. In short, the United States needs to 
maintain the engagement in an effort to challenge China’s coercive economic diplomacy. 
As a participant in ASEAN Plus forums, China maintains veto power in such forums and 
it is wont to use that power. In November 2015, the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting 
Plus ended without a joint declaration that decried China’s assertiveness in the South 
China Sea despite overwhelming support because Beijing wielded its veto power.271 In 
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addition to its veto power, the People’s Republic recognizes its economic clout and its 
ability to use it in a coercive nature. In 2009, a think tank working with the PRC’s 
Ministry of State Security came to this conclusion: “Given the fact that our nation has 
increasing economic power, we should prudently use economic sanctions against those 
countries that undermine world peace and threaten our country’s national interests.”272 
E. CONCLUDING REMARKS: AT A CROSSROADS 
The United States finds itself at a crossroads with the coming election season. 
Current initiatives that I have described will need time to develop before we can 
determine their effectiveness as challenges to Chinese coercive economic policy. In an 
environment where leading candidates are suggesting a return to isolationism and a 
withdrawal from Asia, it is a real concern that the next American presidential 
administration might break off the engagement that has been meticulously constructed 
over the past decade. With numerous demands emerging to divert the attention of 
American foreign policy between the Islamic State, Russia’s resurgence, and worrying 
global economic trends, it would be easy for the United States to shed multilateral work 
in the region and opt for bilateral negotiations and deals. Such an approach would be 
devastating as it would vindicate China’s bilateral approach in the region. Amidst the 
backdrop of Chinese coercive economic policy, there can only be the check of an 
increased American presence through multilateral channels such as ASEAN coupled with 
targeted attempts at improving bilateral relationships when witnessing Chinese attempts 
of coercive economic policy. 
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